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 The dissertation develops a theoretical model to examine the effects of limited 
liability contracting on learning-by-doing and capital investment within a new 
agricultural industry.  The theoretical model applies to many new bio-based industries, 
where novel crops are being used to produce goods, such as chemicals and energy, which 
would not be considered traditional agriculture.  
 Limited-liability contracts create an environment of moral hazard in learning 
investment and adverse selection in the production of the intermediate good.  These two 
features of the contracting environment present difficulties for the principal to benefit 
from the learning-induced cost reductions realized at the intermediate stage of 
production.  Thus, the principal under-invests in the industry and requires less of the 
intermediate good.  Reduced feedstock orders decrease the incentives for the agent to 
invest in learning, and so the ultimate cost of production of the intermediate good is 
higher than optimal.   
 The dissertation adapts the theoretical model to construct a simulation of 
investment and production decisions within an industry for the generation of electricity 
using biomass.  The results of the simulation show that an industry formed around limited 
liability contracts realizes project scales 25-30% smaller than optimal.  Learning-induced 
cost reductions in the production of biomass are 20% less than predicted by engineering 
analyses.  Limited-liability contracts raise the price paid by the principal for the feedstock 
by 25% above optimal. The analysis reveals that the price of electricity necessary for a 
project to break even is 5% higher under limited liability contracts.  Sensitivity analysis 
illustrates that the problem of underinvestment increases under conditions favorable to 
grower learning. 
A capital subsidy paid to processors that invest in technology encourages over-
investment in capital relative to feedstock utilization.  The Renewable Energy Production 
Credit or a feedstock subsidy paid to growers increase project scales by about 30%, yet 
they are still 20% smaller than optimal. These subsidies do not have a significant impact 
on the price of the feedstock to the processor. The government may seek to explore 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction 
 
Bio-based products and bioenergy offer promising new markets to agricultural 
producers.  The new industries emerging from these products are likely to exhibit a 
learning curve in the early stages of development, i.e. costs of production will decrease 
over time as producers gain experience in production.  The prospect of learning-induced 
cost reductions has implications for these new industries in that they affect the timing and 
magnitude of investments necessary for industry formation.  In some cases, these 
learning-induced cost reductions will play a crucial role in determining the profitability 
and ultimate viability of the new industry. 
However, contractual problems may present obstacles for the establishment of 
these industries. The lack of alternative markets for growers, the need for specific 
investments and uncertainty about the viability of the new industries imply that 
relationships between growers and processors will be governed by long-term contracts.  
Limitations in the contractual arrangements may prohibit industries from realizing the 
full economic benefits accrued through learning. As a result, contracting will lead to 
inefficient ex ante investments as compared to the first best and the resulting industry will 
realize lower profits than the socially optimal outcome.  The reduced level of expected 
profits could be a major impediment to the emergence of these new industries. 
The dissertation examines the nature and extent of this potential problem using a 
multiple period model of investment and production in a new industry involved with bio-
based products and energy in which agents make specific investments before the 
occurrence of production and the resolution of uncertainty about the magnitude of future 
learning-induced cost reductions.  Growers adopt novel and unconventional crops while 
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processors incur large investments in processing capacity.  The lack of alternative 
markets for the novel crops and the high adjustment costs faced by the processor have the 
effect of locking the agents into a relationship.  The model pertains to situations like 
molecular farming, where growers produce transgenic crops and a “biorefinery” extracts 
the pharmaceutical chemicals from the crops, or biomass electricity, where growers 
produce switchgrass and a generator converts the crop to electric power.    
The first part of the dissertation presents the theoretical basis for the analysis.  In 
Chapter 2, the discussion motivates the theoretical analysis with a description of the 
salient features of new agricultural industries that are likely to affect their governance 
structures.  New agricultural industries are characterized by novel crops and advanced 
processing technologies, which necessitate specific investments on the part of growers 
and processors alike.   This feature, combined with temporal considerations and 
uncertainty, is likely to play a large role in determining the ultimate structure of the 
industry. 
Another important feature of new agricultural industries is that they are likely to 
exhibit learning-by-doing, where costs of producing the intermediate and final goods 
decline as producers gain experience.  Chapter 2 includes a discussion of learning-by-
doing and a review of the literature concerning the phenomenon. The typical model found 
in the literature for an industry that exhibits learning assumes that a single agent 
(producer) undertakes the production and investment decisions that directly affect 
learning.  The agents also own all of the assets of production and receive the full 
marginal benefit of their actions.  The literature has not addressed the issue of 
coordination of private investments among agents that induce learning and the 
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appropriate organization of the production of intermediate goods in cases where learning 
is important. 
Furthermore, the types of investments undertaken by growers that bring about 
higher levels of learning about particular crops are generally unobservable.  These 
investments are oftentimes non-monetary in nature, pertaining to the care in making 
cropping decisions and the amount of time observing crop performance under various 
conditions.  The magnitude of cost reductions that occur due to learning is also private 
information of the grower.  As a result, the processor faces a contracting environment 
characterized by both moral hazard (in learning investment) and adverse selection (in 
production).   
Uncertainty about the future costs of producing novel crops and the profitability 
of the new industry as a whole further constrains the contracting environment.  At 
present, a spot market for many of the novel crops is non-existent.  The processor, 
therefore, must offer contracts that are designed to induce grower participation by 
offering protection to growers from negative outcomes; such as those where experience-
driven cost reductions are not achieved.  By restricting the contract set to those that limit 
the liability of the grower, the processor ensures adequate expected feedstock production 
and thereby protects his capital investment.  Chapter 2 continues with a discussion of the 
literature on contracting with moral hazard and adverse selection and limited liability 
contracting.  The chapter concludes with a summary of the dissertation’s contribution to 
the literature. 
Chapter 3 contains the core of the theoretical portion, a construction of a two-
period model to analyze a limited liability contractual arrangement between two risk-
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neutral agents in an industry where one agent experiences learning-by-doing and the 
other wishes to benefit from the resultant cost reductions.  The contract must achieve two 
objectives: (1) create incentives for the grower to exert learning effort, or invest in 
learning, and (2) elicit truthful revelation of cost reductions that occur from that learning 
investment.  In order to achieve the two objectives, the contract must promise bonus 
payments, or learning rent, to growers that realize higher levels of learning.   
In general, the analysis reveals that the principal (the processor with a large 
capital investment) is unable to appropriate the gains from learning-by-doing.  This 
results from the combined hidden action and hidden information problem.  In order to 
induce learning effort and elicit information from the agent about the learning that has 
occurred, the principal must make the agent the residual claimant of any of the learning-
induced cost reductions due to his efforts.  The payment of learning rents to growers with 
high levels of learning induces the processor to contract for underproduction of the crop 
relative to the first best for any given level of capital investment. This, in turn, elicits 
under-investment in learning on the part of the grower.  Processors, therefore, do not 
make an efficient investment in capital, resulting in a suboptimal industry size that is 
potentially unprofitable.   
Chapter 3 also includes a discussion of the implications of the model.  Here, 
alternative forms of industry organization are described and discussed.  The potential 
merits of a vertically integrated industry are explored.  In particular, the discussion 
highlights the possibilities for further research in the area of forward vertical integration, 
whereby a cooperative of growers invests in the processing technology. 
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The remaining chapters of the dissertation present the empirical application of the 
theoretical analysis.  These chapters constitute a case study of the biomass for electricity 
generation.  Chapter 4 describes the current state of the biomass for electricity generation, 
the potential societal benefits of the industry, and some predictions from the literature 
about the industry’s viability.  This description is followed by a qualitative analysis of the 
existing contractual arrangements within the industry.  In the qualitative analysis, current 
contracts illustrate the potential difficulties facing the industry in becoming competitive 
with other sources of electricity. 
Chapter 5 consists of the construction of an empirical counterpart to the 
theoretical model of Chapter 3.   For this empirical construction, a processor seeks to 
invest in a biomass generation facility that use advanced gasification technology to be 
located in the North Central Region of the United States.  For each element of the 
theoretical model, Chapter 5 designates and provides justification for functional form, 
reports on the availability of data, and provides parameter estimates for costs and 
production.    The chapter concludes with a calibration of the model via comparison with 
current estimates from the literature of break-even prices and minimum scale of 
generation. 
Chapter 6 presents the results from the empirical model.  The results confirm the 
qualitative results from Chapter 3, showing that limited liability contracts impose a 
significant cost to the industry and may hinder initial investment on the part of the 
processor.  The chapter also includes a sensitivity analysis of the model to three 
parameters: price of electricity, responsiveness of cost to learning effort, and marginal 
disutility of learning effort.    
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The final segment of the empirical analysis explores the policy implications of the 
results.  The potential environmental and rural development benefits arising from a 
biomass for electricity sector may justify government intervention to foster the 
emergence of the industry.  A few policies are currently in place or have been proposed 
to assist the development of the industry.  Three of these policy prescriptions are 
analyzed: the renewable energy production incentive credit (REPI), a subsidy for biomass 
production, and a subsidy for generation capacity investment.  In general, the policy 
analysis shows that the REPI and feedstock subsidy each mitigate a portion of the 
distortion between first and second best outcomes.  However, the amount of learning that 
arises may not be sufficient to render a viable industry.  The analysis also determines that 
a capital subsidy would not perform as well, and may create perverse incentives for 
investment and production within the industry. 
Chapter 7 presents some concluding remarks to the dissertation.  Further 
implications of the model are discussed.  The chapter also discusses possible directions 
for future research that have been revealed by the current analysis. 
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review 
Traditionally, agriculture and agricultural industries have been concerned with the 
production of food, food products, and animal feed.  Many new agricultural industries 
will form around the production of non-traditional agricultural products, such as 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, energy, and fuels.  The crops proposed for these industries 
are oftentimes unfamiliar to current agricultural producers and require sophisticated 
processing technologies to extract the marketable product.  Thus, emerging agricultural 
industries necessitate specific investments on the part of both the grower and the 
processor. 
It is likely that as growers become more familiar with new crops and processors 
with new technologies, production efficiency will increase.  This effect of learning by 
doing is likely to play a role in the development of these new industries.  In the case of 
biomass for energy, for example, industry analysts expect cost reductions to occur in the 
production of crops as growers assimilate advances from research and development.  
Experience has also shown that renewable energy technologies, such as that to be used by 
the processor, exhibit a learning curve, i.e. costs decline with increasing experience  
(McDonald and Schrattenholzer).  Indeed, many feasibility studies for biomass energy 
and other renewable sources present potential cost reductions as evidence that the 
industry may be viable at a future date.  (Marrison & Larson, Graham et al.) 
The markets for processed bio-products are likely to feature greater competition 
than the market for intermediate goods.  Energy producers, for instance, must compete 
with other sources of energy (fossil fuels and other renewable sources).  Bio-chemical 
and bio-pharmaceutical producers must compete with producers that employ 
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conventional technologies.  Faced with lower cost competitors in the market for their 
final products, processors will be forced to pass learning-induced cost savings to the final 
consumer of the good.  Growers, though, may not face similar market conditions, and 
therefore may not pass learning-induced savings associated with the intermediate good to 
the processor.  Transportation costs associated with new agricultural crops, among other 
factors discussed later in this chapter, may limit entry into the thereby limiting the 
amount of competition for the intermediate good supplied to the processors.  These 
factors could create a disincentive for growers to reduce crop prices to processors as the 
cost of producing the crop declines.  If the market for the final good is particularly 
competitive, as in the case of electricity, then the inability of the processor to pass the 
cost savings realized by the grower onto the final consumer may prove detrimental to the 
viability of the new agricultural industry.  Furthermore, the inability of the processor to 
appropriate the gains from learning presents an obstacle to the initial investment in the 
industry, potentially depriving society of certain environmental amenities, as well as 
reducing the welfare of rural communities that could reap economic benefits.   
An investigation of the extant literature reveals that many of the characteristics of 
the problem described here have been previously addressed.   The literature discusses and 
analyses several implications of learning by doing in new industries.  The literature also 
contains exhaustive analyses of the implications of moral hazard and adverse selection in 
procurement contracts.  However, much of the literature concerning learning has dealt 
with the implications of learning-induced cost reductions on market structure, i.e. 
competition among producers, and market entry. Much of the literature on contracts 
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between agents when there is potential for future cost reductions focuses on cases of 
government procurement of products and services from the private sector.   
The literature has not fully addressed several issues intrinsic to the problem at 
hand, such as the issue of coordination of private investments among agents that induce 
learning and the appropriate organization of the production of intermediate goods in cases 
where learning is important.  Specifically, the literature does not contain an application of 
contracting with learning to the formation of a new industry nor does it contain an 
empirical investigation of the implications for contractual agreements on learning in new 
industries.    
This chapter reviews three strands of literature that are relevant to this 
dissertation.  The first section of the chapter discusses the literature concerning industry 
traits and their implications for the organization between stages of production within the 
industry.  The second section discusses learning and its implications for new industries.  
The third and final section considers the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection 
in contractual environments.   
Structure of New Industry 
Several characteristics of new agricultural industries will likely influence the 
optimal governance structure. New agricultural industries feature relationship-specific 
investments for producing and processing novel crops, poorly developed markets for 
those crops, and uncertainty in agricultural production.  Each of these characteristics has 
significant implications for industrial organization.   Combined, these characteristics 
imply that new agricultural industries may benefit from vertical coordination between 
stages of production, either through vertical integration or through long-term contracting.   
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Relationship-specific assets are those that have little or no value outside of an 
economic relationship.  Relationship specific assets expose investors to the risk of 
opportunism on the part of trading partners.  As a result, agents may be hesitant to invest 
in specific assets without assurances (by way of a contract) of a future market for a good.  
Williamson categorizes relationship-specific investments as dedicated assets, location 
specific asset, and physical specific assets. 
Most of the investments necessary for a new agricultural industry to take shape 
may be characterized as dedicated assets.  Growers are not likely to begin production of 
novel crops without the assurance that a processing facility will be built to procure and 
market those crops, and processors are not likely to construct a facility without the 
assurance that growers will produce the novel crops.  Once an agreement is made to form 
a new agricultural project, it is possible that a significant amount of time passes before 
production of crops and bio-products occurs.  Some processing facilities may take years 
to construct, particularly those requiring sophisticated technologies.  In many cases, the 
novel crops may take several years to reach the level of maturity necessary for use as an 
input to production.  During this phase, growers dedicate all their physical and human 
assets to the production of crops that likely have little value to any other user than the 
future processor. In addition, any experience gained in the production of those crops may 
be considered a dedicated asset, as that knowledge has no value to other industries and 
may not be transferable to the production of other crops. 
Investments are site specific when agents must locate near each other for the 
purposes of minimizing inventory or transportation costs.  The bulkiness of crops results 
in high costs of transportation of biomass. These costs could comprise a significant 
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portion of the costs of production of bio-products, thereby limiting the distance that can 
exist between the processors and the growers.  Due to the need to minimize transportation 
costs, the processor and growers are engaged in a so-called cheek-by-jowl arrangement 
and the processing facility must be located in close proximity to the growers of crops.  
In addition to site specificity, the processors’ technologies may be characterized 
by a high degree of physical asset specificity.  The quality of biomass varies considerably 
from region to region.  Energy content, impurities, moisture content, nutrient content are 
all examples of properties that fluctuate due to the quality of soil and climate in which 
they are grown, as well as the cropping practices of agricultural producers.  Sophisticated 
processing technologies may require adjustments to tolerate the particular nature of the 
biomass supplied by the producer.   Some technologies may be designed from the onset 
to handle the quality of biomass inherent to a specific region, or growing area.  The costs 
to the processor will depend on the level and precision of adjustments made to the 
technology. Greater specialization of the technology confers a higher degree of physical 
asset specificity on the processor’s investment.  
Temporal considerations may also play an important role in the organization of 
new agricultural industry.  In addition to a time lag before crops reach a level of maturity 
necessary for use as an input to production, a processor may require a supply of biomass 
over a long period of time, possibly decades. This implies the need for a supply 
arrangement between growers and processors that exceed the length of typical 
agricultural contracts. Long-term contracting is currently uncommon in United States 
agriculture, and in those sectors where it does exist “long-term” is defined in terms of 
four to seven years.   
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The presence of relationship-specific investments suggest that vertical integration 
or a form of contracting will be preferred to the development of a spot market 
(Williamson, Joskow (1985, 1990), Wolak).  Uncertainty in agricultural production, 
uncertainty about the extent of cost reductions through learning and uncertainty in the 
markets for energy resources suggest that contract breach may pose a problem under 
certain conditions.  Joskow (1985, 1990) has shown that long-term contracts have proven 
effective and resilient to breach in the minemouth-coal electricity generation industry.  In 
minemouth coal, uncertainty results from the variability in the price of the final product, 
electricity.  However, contracts are designed such that the price of coal may be adjusted 
regularly for changes in the market for electricity.  Although some variability exists in the 
costs of producing the coal for use in generation, this variability is directly related to the 
rate of inflation.  As a result, the price of coal may also be adjusted regularly for inflation 
within the industrial sector. 
In contrast, agricultural production is subject to persistent randomness due to 
changes in weather and growing conditions. In a new agricultural industry, uncertainty 
results from this randomness, as well as in variability in the value of the crop to the 
processor and in the probability of learning-induced cost reductions.  It may be difficult 
to develop a contract that allows for feedstock price adjustment that accounts for the 
various avenues of uncertainty.  Additionally, growers have a number of outside 
opportunities, such as the production of conventional crops or participation in the 
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), which may make them unwilling to take on the 
risk of producing a novel crop.   
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In these industries, it is more plausible that uncertainty will impinge upon the 
willingness of agents to enter into contractual arrangements from the onset.  To induce 
grower participation in the new industry, processors may need to shield growers from all 
or most of the risk associated with novel crop adoption.  Thus, the industry may need to 
rely on limited liability contracts in the early stages of formation. 
Learning by Doing  
 The phenomenon of decreasing production costs with increasing experience was 
first observed in the production of airframes.  Engineers documented a precise inverse 
relationship between the number of labor-hours used in the production of an airframe and 
the number of airframes that had already been produced.  This effect has since been 
observed in other industries and has been attributed to learning-by-doing, or production 
experience within an industry. 
Kenneth Arrow formalized the effect in his seminal work on the economic 
implications of learning where he uses cumulative production experience as a proxy for 
learning.  Arrow (1962) applied his analysis to the problem of economic growth, 
attempting to endogenize changes in productivity within an economy using a variable 
representing experience.  This work has inspired a strand of literature that extends beyond 
the original macroeconomic focus, covering a wide range of economic environments 
where learning may have a significant impact. 
Rosen (1972) was perhaps the first to formalize a microeconomic model of 
learning.  He proposed a model of learning-by-doing for an individual firm where 
learning is an output of a joint production process.  Rosen considers the case where 
learning is entirely proprietary, i.e. firm-specific and non-transferable.   Here, knowledge 
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that results from learning is closely aligned with entrepreneurship, or the ability to 
“organize and maintain complex production processes that take fuller advantage of 
possibilities for economizing through specialization of function and division of labor 
within the firm.”   Rosen’s model focuses on the intertemporal allocation of resources by 
a firm that realizes cost reductions from learning.  The main conclusion of the analysis is 
that the firm finds it profitable to incur present costs associated with learning in order to 
reduce future costs associated with input use. 
Spence (1982) considered the implications of learning by firms in the context of a 
competitive marketplace.  Spence identifies the analogy of learning-by-doing and 
increasing returns to scale.  Because learning is directly related to the total quantity of a 
firm’s experience, industry costs are minimized with a single producer.  A social 
optimum is achieved with single producer that sets price equal to marginal cost.  
However, a single producer creates a monopoly and so a tradeoff exists between price 
competition and costs.   
Subsequent analyses have extended and modified the models of Rosen and 
Spence using a variety of techniques that include discrete (Petrakis et al.) and continuous 
dynamic optimization (Brueckner & Raymon), over finite (Ghemawat & Spence) and 
infinite horizons (Mookherjee & Ray.)  These analyses have examined a number of 
permutations associated with market and cost structures, that include the impact of 
learning spillovers between firms (Fudenberg & Tirole, Ghemwat & Spence), the 
potential for collusive price paths (Mookherjee & Ray), and the significance of increasing 
versus constant marginal costs of production (Petrakis).   
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Although the list above is not exhaustive, the models all share some common 
elements.  One common element of these models is that they assume a single agent 
(producer) undertakes the production and investment decisions that directly affect 
learning.  These “learner” agents own all of the assets of production and receive the full 
marginal benefit of their actions (Rosen, Fudenberg, Spence, Brueckner and Raymon).    
One aspect not addressed in the literature is the issue of learning when it occurs at 
the intermediate stage of production within a vertically coordinated industry.  In 
particular, the literature has not addressed the coordination of private investments among 
agents that induce learning and the appropriate organization of the production of 
intermediate goods in cases where learning is important.  For new agricultural industries, 
it is unlikely that one agent will make all of the relevant decisions.  That is, it is unlikely 
that one agent will make all decisions pertaining to investment in growing and processing 
of the crops, as well as production of the intermediate and final goods.  Coordination 
between phases of production will be necessary 
Another common facet of the models is that learning is essentially a costless 
endeavor, the result of a joint production process.  These existing models of learning-by-
doing follow Arrow’s lead and focus on learning as it relates to cumulative input use or 
output production.  However, Arrow offers an alternative definition of learning that does 
not preclude the existence of learning costs.  In his words, learning may occur through 
the “attempt to solve a problem and therefore only takes place during activity.”    
In new agricultural industries, some learning will be costless to the private sector, 
as it will result from the transfer of research and development efforts from the public to 
the private sectors.  This learning may include knowledge about new crop hybrids, 
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planting techniques, and harvest timing that arise from genetic and agronomic studies.  
However, any production cost reductions that occur from this transfer will depend on the 
ability of growers to incorporate research developments.  It has been observed that 
agriculture is characterized by heterogeneity of agents and resources.  As a result, 
agricultural production displays site specificity, agriculture varies from site to site, and is 
therefore highly dependent on management (Lichtenberg). Learning in new agricultural 
industries is also likely to be site specific, dependent on the resource base of a particular 
region and grower.  Thus, even the transfer public sector learning will require effort on 
the part of the growers to modify and adapt the knowledge to their particular conditions 
and experience. 
A significant portion of learning will occur from the entrepreneurship, in Rosen’s 
terminology, of the growers themselves.  A critical period for many biomass crops is the 
establishment phase, the early period of cultivation.  During this period, management 
practices may have a substantial impact on yields during the harvest period. As an 
example, poor management in the establishment of a perennial crop stand, such as those 
used in biomass energy, has significant consequences by reducing the yields for several 
seasons of production (Sanderson et al.)  During this phase, learning occurs through the 
diligence of the grower in observing crop responses to inputs and land quality and 
making appropriate adjustments in cropping practices.  This entrepreneurial learning in 
agriculture is related to a grower’s experience with the novel crop.  However, the crops 
are not harvested during the establishment phase when learning occurs and so one cannot 
relate this learning to cumulative output of the grower.  Thus learning in this phase will 
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be directly related to some effort exerted by the grower, which cannot be measured by 
cumulative output.    
In a sense, there may be two phases of learning in agriculture.  For each crop 
stand, there is learning associated with the establishment of the crop; one may designate 
this as intra-period learning.  There is also learning that may extend beyond the life of a 
particular crop stand that is linked to total experience, or inter-period learning.  For two 
reasons, intra-period learning during the establishment phase may matter the most for the 
initial development of new agricultural industries. First, it is difficult to forecast 
economic conditions over a long horizon.  In order to make appropriate investments in a 
new industry, decisions will be based on short-term forecasts of crop productivity.  These 
short-term forecasts are based on outcomes from management during the establishment 
phase of the crop stand.  Second, if establishment practices affect the productivity of the 
crop stand over several years, then profitability of the industry will also be affected over 
several years, or the lifespan of the crop stand.  Thus, profits and losses of the industry 
are magnified in that they extend over the period of a lifespan of a crop stand, or at least 
over a period of a few years needed to establish a new crop stand.  Early losses in the 
industry may serve as a signal to investors that there will be an extended period of losses 
due to poor crop productivity.  Investors may decide to abandon the new industry rather 
than take a “wait and see” approach to determine if cost reductions occur from continued 
production. 
This intra-period learning may best be modeled as an investment in time and care 
on the part of the grower.   These investments are oftentimes non-monetary in nature.  As 
stated before, these activities may pertain to the care in making cropping decisions or the 
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amount of time observing crop performance under various conditions.   The challenge, 
then, lies in the forming contractual arrangements that induce the appropriate level of this 
learning investment on the part of the grower that lead to cost reductions to be enjoyed by 
the industry as a whole. 
Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in Contracts 
The types of investments and activities undertaken by agents to induce higher 
levels of learning are generally unobservable.  In addition, the magnitude of cost 
reductions that occur due to learning is the private information of the grower.  This poses 
two problems to the processor when offering a contract to the grower. Because the 
processor cannot observe the effort exerted by the grower that may lead to cost 
reductions, the processor faces a hidden action problem.  In addition, the processor can 
not observe the actual realization of learning, i.e. the true cost of production, and so the 
processor faces a hidden information problem.  The contracting environment is thus 
characterized by both moral hazard in learning investment and adverse selection in 
production.  This environment creates a problem where a new industry may be unable to 
appropriate the gains from grower learning, thereby hindering the formation and 
development of a viable industry.    
Uncertainty about the future costs of producing novel crops and the profitability 
of the industry as a whole further constrains the contracting environment.  For many of 
these emerging industries, spot markets for the biomass crops are non-existent.  In 
addition, the notion of producing pharmaceuticals or electricity from biomass is foreign 
to many, especially within the United States, and may even appear “faddish” to many 
agricultural producers.  The processor, therefore, must offer contracts that are designed to 
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induce grower participation by offering protection to growers from negative outcomes; 
such as those where experience-driven cost reductions are not achieved.  By restricting 
the contract set to those that limit the liability of the grower, the processor ensures 
adequate expected feedstock production and thereby protects his capital investment.   
The literature on investments on the part of agents under contracts with 
asymmetric information is vast.  However, a handful of the analyses contained in the 
literature summarize the basic results of contracting in this environment.  In general, the 
issue of investment that leads to cost reductions, i.e. the learning investment, has been 
placed in the context of a regulator and a firm or in the context of government 
procurement.  In the case of the regulated firm, the government must set a policy based 
on the firm’s cost.  As an example, a regulatory agency may set the price for electricity 
for a utility that serves a particular region.  In addition, the firm may engage in activities 
that lead to the reduction of future costs.  These activities are unobservable and the 
resulting costs are unverifiable.  The government or regulator would like to take 
advantage of any cost reductions accrued to the firm. 
In problems of this type, the government must rely on a menu of contracts, or 
price-quantity pairs, from which the firm selects once it observes its true costs of 
production. The regulated price-quantity pairs must be attractive enough to allow the 
utility some profit, as well as create incentives for investing in learning.  Yet the price-
quantity pairs must also be such that they benefit the utility’s customers.  The regulator 
requires information from the utility, yet the firm has an incentive to misrepresent this 
information.  The menu of contracts relies on the reported type of the regulated firm 
because the true type of the firm is unobservable by the regulator.  By the revelation 
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principle, the regulator may restrict the menu of choices to those that are incentive 
compatible and elicit truthful revelation of cost by the regulated firm. (Myerson)  In 
general, the firm has an advantage over the regulator in that it possesses private 
information about costs.  This allows the firm to extract rent, “information rent”, from the 
regulator.  The payment of information rent elicits a truthful revelation from the firm.  
The need to pay information rent prohibits attainment of a first best outcome.   
In one of the earliest models of this form, Baron & Besanko include research and 
development on the part of the firm.   In a two-period model, the regulator wishes to elicit 
truthful revelation of costs in both the first and second periods, as well as influence the 
firm’s level of investment in R & D in the first period.  The results depend on the level of 
correlation that exists between first and second period costs to the firm.  In the case 
where costs are correlated, such as may occur in learning by doing,  contracts of this sort 
do not allow for attainment of first best levels of investment in research by the firm.  Ex 
ante contracts also do not allow for the regulator to set the optimal price for the firm’s 
regulated product in the second period.  This result has been reproduced by other 
analysts, notably Laffont and Tirole.   
Sappington examined the issue of limited liability contracts under asymmetric 
information.  Here, there is no investment on the part of the firm, so there is no moral 
hazard complicating the contractual environment.  However, there is uncertainty about 
the cost of production in the second period and the purchasing entity guarantees a 
minimal payment to the producing firm.  The cost of producing the good is private 
information of the firm.  Sappington invokes the revelation principle and restricts his 
attention to the set of contracts that elicit truthful revelation.  The main effect of limiting 
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liability is to increase the amount of information rent paid to the firm for the traded good.  
In general, the contract offers the greatest per unit price for the good plus the largest 
absolute information rent to the firm when it realizes the lowest possible cost of 
production.  In order to receive the payment, the firm must also produce the largest 
quantity of the good at the lowest per unit cost.  This practice of increasing the payment, 
information rent, and the quantity accordingly, as the firm cost declines, creates an 
incentive compatible mechanism.  However, limited liability does not allow for a contract 
that punishes poorly performing firms. Information rent is always non-negative under 
limited liability, and so production is skewed downward away from the first best.  
 Laffont and Martimort generalize the results of Baron & Besanko and Sappington.  
In the generalized model, a firm is offered a limited liability contract in the first-period 
that elicits investment in cost-reducing activities.  As expected, a first best is unattainable.  
Investment in cost reductions is less than first best, and the contract elicits 
underproduction over the entire range of outcomes, except the worst. 
More recently, Osmundsen proposed of model of learning-by-doing under 
contracts by expanding upon the Baron-Besanko framework. In this model, second-
period cost reductions depend on first-period output.  However, the model employs the 
Arrow technique of using cumulative output as a measure of learning.  The contract in 
this environment uses countervailing incentives to elicit lower costs in the second period.  
If the firm reports high costs in the first period, by choosing low levels of production, 
then it will face higher costs of production and extract lower rent from the regulator in the 
second-period.  There exists a tradeoff for the firm between first period and second 
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period revelation of costs which, under certain conditions of the distribution of efficiency 
types, may allow the regulator to attain a solution closer to the first best outcome. 
Contribution to the Literature  
 The need for location and relationship-specific assets, combined with temporal 
considerations, imply that new agricultural industries will be governed by some form of 
long-term contracting.  Uncertainty about the prospect of the industry and unfamiliarity 
with novel crops may deter involvement on the part of growers without some form of 
payment guarantees.  On the other hand, this unfamiliarity underlies the potential for 
learning within the industry that may reduce the cost of producing the novel crops.   
Learning requires effort on the part of the grower.  This effort is, in general, 
unobservable by the processor and therefore non-contractible.  The resulting cost 
reductions are private information of the grower and therefore unverifiable by the 
processor.  Thus, new agricultural industries are likely to exhibit moral hazard in learning 
effort, as well as adverse selection in the production of the intermediate good.   
Although the problem of limited liability contracts in the presence of moral 
hazard and adverse selection has been explored in the literature, the contracts have been 
limited to the case where the principal (government, regulator, procuring agent) does not 
make an investment.  The size of projects in these models is exogenous to the model, or 
irrelevant.  In the case of new agricultural industries, the principal is a processor that 
must determine the size of the project, as well as the quantity of the intermediate good for 
use in production of the final good.  This dissertation presents a model similar to that of 
Laffont and Tirole, yet modified to include an investment in processing capacity on the 
part of the principal. 
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In addition, the dissertation contributes an empirical application of the model that 
quantifies the inefficiencies that arise from this contracting environment.  The empirical 
application allows for a better understanding of how these contracts may impinge upon 




Chapter 3.  Theoretical Model 
Analysis of the impact of limited liability contracts on learning within a new 
industry proceeds via construction of a theoretical model.  In the model, a processor (the 
principal) wishes to enter a contractual relationship with a producer of an intermediate 
good.  The producer of the intermediate good may be a grower or a cooperative of 
growers acting as a single grower (the agent) that cultivates a new agricultural crop.  Due 
to the specificity of the relationship that arises between the two parties, the processor and 
grower wish to secure an agreement before making investments and producing output.  A 
timeline of the model is appears in Figure 1. 
In the first period, the processor offers a contract to the grower.  The contract 
consists of a menu of production and payment options from which the grower will choose 
at a later date.  In the second period, both parties make investments in relationship-
specific assets. The processor invests in physical capital, such as a processing facility, 
that requires feedstock from the grower.  The grower undertakes investments that are 
unobservable and unverifiable.  These investments in learning, have a direct impact on 
the grower’s future production costs. Many of these investments are non-monetary, as 
they may include the amount of time spent by the grower in observing crop responses to 
certain inputs and determining optimal soil conditions for growth or the amount of care 
taken in making appropriate cropping decisions.  
Despite the level of investment undertaken by the grower, there is always a 
possibility that no cost reductions will result.  Agricultural uncertainty is always present 
and in any period poor growing conditions may overshadow any benefits accrued through 
experience. The impact of the learning investment is probabilistic and affects only the 
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distribution of the costs; the ultimate impact on future costs is uncertain. Learning 
investments, therefore, only increase the probability that costs will be reduced at a future 
date. In the third, and final, period, the grower observes the resulting costs and chooses a 
production level and corresponding payment from the contract menu that was offered in 
the first period.  Trade occurs between the processor and grower. 
Figure 1.  Timeline of the Model 
Both the processor and the agent are risk-neutral agents.  The investment made by 
the processor is much larger, in monetary terms, than that of the grower and so the 
processor faces much higher adjustment costs than the grower.  It is assumed in the 
model that the grower has no conversion costs, i.e. she may switch costlessly from the 
project crop, which has uncertain value, to another commodity, of certain value.  The 
relative magnitude of investments combined with the outside option of the grower places 
the burden on the processor to ensure a future supply of feedstock. In order to induce 
adequate grower participation, a contract must be written that satisfies the grower in all 
states of nature, i.e., one that limits the grower’s liability in bad states of nature yet offers 
adequate incentives for grower to invest and produce at near-optimal levels.  Thus, the 
grower acts risk neutral toward outcomes where her income is at least equal to her 
outside option. 
  Period              1                                                2                                                       3       
State of nature (θ)  
    revealed  
    Processor          Agents make      Grower observes θ, 
offers contract         investments in                               chooses production- 
   to Grower         specific assets                  payment scheme from 
               contract menu 
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Consider the grower’s production technology.  The cost of producing crops is 
stochastic, dependent on the level of production, q, and the state of nature, θ.  The 
investment made by the grower, e, may be viewed as the quality of management or 
entrepreneurship effort exerted by the growers in production.  Although this investment 
does not directly affect costs, it has an impact on the distribution of the state of nature.  In 
other words, a high level of investment increases the probability of a favorable state of 
nature, where learning has resulted in significant cost reductions.  Cost, C(q,θ), is 
increasing and convex in crop production and decreasing in the state of nature.  Using 
subscripts to denote partial derivatives, this may be summarized as:  C1(q,θ)>0, 
C11(q,θ)>0, C2(q,θ)<0, C22(q,θ)>0.  The marginal cost of production also decreases in 
favorable states of nature, C12(q,θ)<0.  
The state of nature may take any value in the support, ],[ θθθ ∈ , where θ  is the 
worst state of nature.  The cumulative distribution, G(q,θ), and probability density, 
g(q,θ), of θ are conditional on investment where 







and investment has no effect on the supports of the distribution, 
( ) ( ) 0== eGeG ee θθ . 
In addition, the probability distribution exhibits diminishing marginal returns to 
investment at higher levels of learning investment, 






eG eee  
The processor creates a final good using capital, K, and the grower’s output, q. 
The production function, f(K,q), is increasing and concave in both arguments, f1(·)>0, 
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f11(·)<0, f2(·)>0, f22(·)<0, and the inputs are complementary, f12(·)>0. The cost of physical 
capital is represented as r, on the monetary value per unit of processing.  The processor 
faces an output price, p, for the final good. 
First Best Solution 
As a benchmark for the analysis, consider the first best levels of production and 
investment.   A number of benchmarks may be chosen for this analysis; in particular one 
may choose to consider the outcome of the industry under a governance structure, such as 
another form of contract or some form of vertical integration.   The first best outcome 
serves as the benchmark primarily because the analysis in the dissertation is, in part, a 
response to engineering analyses of new agricultural industries.  These analyses 
implicitly assume first best conditions: full, symmetric information; a single agent that 
makes all investment and production decisions; and, a single agent that receives the full 
marginal benefit of all investments.  The benefits, both direct and ancillary, of these new 
industries are often based on these engineering assumptions.  By reproducing engineering 
analyses through a first best regime and comparing them to a limited-liability contracting 
regime, one may better understand the magnitude of overestimation (underestimation) of 
the benefits (costs) reported in those analyses. 
In a first best regime, a social planner chooses production that maximizes total 
surplus.  The optimal level of production in each state of the world is selected ex post, i.e. 
after the resolution of uncertainty about over the state of nature, or the level of realized 
production costs. 
( ) ( ){ }θ,,max qCqKpfV
q
FB −=  
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This implies that the marginal cost of producing the intermediate good (the crop) 
must equal the marginal benefit of producing the final good in every state of nature. 
( ) ( ) θθ ∀=−=
∂
∂ 0,, 12 qCqKpfq
V FB         (1) 
The first order condition produces a best response function for crop production 
based on the level of capital invested and the state of nature, ( )θ,Kq , which may be used 
ex ante to solve for the optimal level of investments in capital and learning.  The planner 
maximizes expected surplus, 
















The first order conditions for the ex ante maximization are,  
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Applying the relationship found in equation (1) to the first-order condition for 
capital investment simplifies equation (2) to the following: 






In words, the level of capital investment should be chosen at the point where the expected 
marginal value product of capital equals the marginal cost of investing in that capital. 
The first-order condition for learning effort (3) simplifies upon integration by 
parts followed by application of equation (1).  Using the following identity, 
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∫ ∫−= vduuvudv   
and defining u and v as follows, 








equation (3) implies that, 
 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )


















Applying condition (1) and the condition, stated earlier, that investment has no impact on 
the supports of the distribution, equation (3) reduces to, 











Similar to the condition for capital investment, the condition above states that amount of 
effort put forth in learning should be chosen at the point where the expected marginal 
decrease in feedstock production cost associated with learning equals the marginal cost of 
learning effort. Equations (1)-(3) will be used later in the analysis to compare the first 
best results with those investment levels obtained in a contractual environment. 
 In order to ensure an optimal solution, the benefit function, or the social planner’s 
objective function, must also satisfy certain concavity requirements.  Ex post, the benefit 
function must be concave in the level of feedstock production.  Ex ante, the benefit 
function must be concave in the levels of investment in capital and learning.  In the 
interest of conserving space, a full derivation and discussion of the sufficient conditions 
to ensure optimality appear in Appendix A. 
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Contracting Solution 
The contractual environment is characterized by ex ante moral hazard and ex post 
adverse selection.  Ex ante, the principal wishes to elicit optimal investment choice by the 
agent, which is a hidden action.  The optimal level of investment may not be achievable 
due to the need to induce grower participation in the new project.  When the grower has 
an outside option, such as a conventional crop, she may choose to enter into a joint 
project only when offered a guarantee that her income will be at least as great as that she 
could realize from the conventional crop. This imposes a constraint on the principal to 
offer a limited liability contract that ensures the grower at least his reservation utility (the 
value of the other commodity) in all states of nature.  In a sense, the grower acts as 
though she has infinite risk aversion below her reservation utility. The need to limit 
liability to the grower reduces the overall power of the contract, thereby reducing 
incentives to invest in learning.   
The principal also offers a contract to elicit optimal production levels given the ex 
post level of learning that has occurred.  A number of mechanisms may achieve this end, 
but by the revelation principle the analysis simplifies by restricting the solution to a 
contract that elicits truthful revelation of costs.  Myerson shows that there exists a 
mechanism that elicits a truthful reporting strategy and performs at least as well as all 
other mechanisms.  The state of nature is hidden information, observed only by the 
grower.  This further constrains the principal, who must now offer extra incentives to 
elicit truthful information from the grower, i.e. learning rents.  The following model is 
similar to one presented by Laffont and Tirole.  It differs in that the principal also has an 
investment choice. 
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The principal, faced with ex post adverse selection, offers a contract of payment 
and production schedules designed to elicit truthful revelation of the state of nature by the 
agent.  Payment for crop production consists a variable portion, w that depends on the 
level of production, q.  After the resolution of the state of nature, the agent indirectly 
reveals the actual state of nature through her choice of q from the contract menu.  For a 
payment-production scheme for the “announced” state of nature, θ̂ , an agent of type 
θ will find that her best response is to announce the true state of nature.  The choice of 
production, therefore, depends on the state of nature and so production may be 
represented by ( )θq .  The variable portion of the payment that is dependent on q is 
therefore also dependent on the reported state of nature and may be represented by ( )θ̂w .  
The utility (ex post) of an agent (grower) of typeθ that has announced, through her 
choice of contract option, that she is type θ̂ is 
( ) ( ) ( )( )θθθθθ ,ˆˆ,ˆ qCwV G −= . 
Therefore the contract must designed so that a grower maximizes her utility through 
truthful revelation and the grower has no incentive to falsify her type.  These conditions 
(4) formally appear below. 
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θθ ′≠∀     (4) 
To ensure that the grower achieves a maximum, the second-order condition with 
respect to announced type must be non-positive, 
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Incentive compatibility of the contract implies that the conditions (4) hold in all states of 
nature. Truthful revelation therefore implies that θθ =ˆ  and so ( ) ( )θθθθ ,,ˆ GG UU = .  
Therefore, differentiation of condition (4) with respect to the state of nature results in the 
following:








V G  
Substitution of the second-order condition with respect to announced type implies that, 
for the condition to hold ( )( ) ( ) 0,12 ≤θθθ θqqC , and so, therefore, ( ) 0≥θθq .  In words, if 
a separating equilibrium exists whereby each state of nature is associated with a unique 
production level, the production level increases monotonically with the state of nature. 
The generator will offer a contract that elicits greater production of feedstock in better 
states of nature. 
Differentiation of the grower’s utility function over type and application of the 
envelope theorem yields, 









∂   (5) 
In other words, the increase in utility to the grower that arises from an increase in the 
state of nature is equal in magnitude to the marginal decrease in feedstock production 
cost that occurs.  Although it is possible to elicit truthful revelation through a mechanism 
that demands greater output in better states of nature, the revelation comes at a cost 
greater than the marginal cost of producing the additional output.   
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This cost, or learning rent, may be found by deriving an expression for the the 
payment scheme.   An expression for the total payment given to the grower in a particular 
state of nature, ( )θw , may be found by integrating the first part of condition (4) over 
types: 






θθ θθθθθθθθθθθ dqqCwwdqqCw  
The first part of condition (4) equals zero in all states of nature.  In addition, one may 
apply the following identity, 







+= ,  
so that the expression for the total payment reduces to: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∫−+−=
θ
θ
θθθθθθ dzzzqCqCqCww ,,, 2  
The other crop commodity that may be grown by the agent has no value to the principal 
but it plays a role in determining the grower’s reservation utility, Π.  This implies that the 
contract must satisfy (ex ante) the following participation constraint, 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) θθθθθθ ∀Π≥−= ,, qCwV G       (6) 
In order to minimize the total amount of rents that the processor must pay for truthful 
revelation, the payment is designed so that equation (6) holds at equality in the worst 
state of nature. 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) Π=−= θθθθθ ,, qCwV G       (7) 
Substitution of this condition into the expression for total payment to the grower results 
in 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )( )∫−+Π=
θ
θ
θθθ dzzzqCqCw ,, 2      (8) 
Information rents to the grower are represented by the last element of equation (8) and 
are equivalent to all of the learning rents, i.e. all of the cost reductions attributable to the 
investments in learning that the grower has made.  In effect, the payment to the grower 
takes the form of a cost-plus reimbursement scheme, whereby the processor pays the 
grower the opportunity costs of her resources (land, labor), the production costs of the 
crop, plus an additional amount (learning rent) to induce higher levels of production in 
more favorable states of nature. 
Optimal ex ante investment by the grower is represented by 





θθθθ ,maxarg , 
which implies that equation (3), the first-order condition for grower investment in the 
social optimum, must hold in the contractual environment.  Using integration by parts, as 
before, the first-order condition reduces to: 
( )( ) ( ) 01,2 =−∫ θθθθ
θ
θ
deGqC e  
When solving for optimal level of production, the processor must take into account this 
condition – the moral hazard in investment constraint.  Adding the constraint to the 
processor’s profit maximization problem allows the processor to solve for the grower’s 
equilibrium choice of learning investment, i.e. the grower’s best response to the 
contractual terms.  The processor’s problem, therefore, is 
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The processor Lagrangian, after appropriate substitutions and rearrangement of terms, 
may be written as,  
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Integrating by parts the final term within the first set of brackets (above), the Lagrangian 
may be further simplified as,   
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where λ represents the shadow price of the grower investment constraint.  The four first-
order conditions to the problem are: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
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deGqC e        (12) 
Inspection of the first-order conditions under limited liability contracts reveal that 
the first best solution is not achieved.  Condition (9) reveals that the quantity of the 
intermediate good, the feedstock for the processor, is not selected at the level where the 
marginal value product of the input equals the marginal cost of procuring the input.   An 
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additional term appears in the first best condition for feedstock production that creates a 
distortion between first and second best outcomes.   
Additional terms also appear in the condition for the learning investment, 
implying that limited liability contracts also distort the level of effort taken by the grower 
in learning.  Condition (11) appears identical to the first best solution for the optimal 
level of capital investment.  However, the production schedule for the intermediate good 
appears as an argument of the production function for the final good.  By condition (9), 
the production schedules are not the same in the first and second best solutions.  
Therefore, a distortion must also exist in the level of capital investment undertaken by the 
processor. 
Alternatively, the processor’s problem may be written as a two-stage problem. 
The first stage of the problem may be solved using optimal control of the feedstock 
production over states of nature.  The second stage of the problem may be solved using 
static optimization for the investments in capital and learning.  The Hamiltonian for the 
optimal control problem and a more formal treatment of the optimal solution is presented 
in Appendix A.  In addition, the Appendix also includes a discussion of the second-order 
conditions necessary to ensure optimality of the solution to the processor’s problem. 
Comparison of Contracting Solution with the First Best 
 In this section of the chapter, the first-order conditions are analyzed to ascertain 
the direction of the inefficiency in learning effort and feedstock production that occurs 
under contracting.  Is there overproduction or underproduction of feedstock under 
contracts relative to the first best?  Is there too much learning effort, or too little, put forth 
under contracts?  In addition, the analysis determines if there exists an effect of these 
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inefficiencies on the overall scale of the project.   Do these inefficiencies also create 
inefficiency in capital investment under contracts relative to the first best?  If so, is there 
an overinvestment in capital or an underinvestment? 
To answer the questions about the direction of distortions between first and 
second best outcomes, the analysis first compares crop production levels between the first 
and second best outcomes.  This accomplished by identifying the wedge term in the first-
order condition for feedstock production and determining that it is positive in sign, 
implying underproduction of feedstock.  Further, a monotonicity condition is imposed to 
ensure a separating equilibrium.  This condition allows for determination of the relative 
level of underproduction over the states of nature.  The second part of the analysis 
identifies a positive correlation at the optimum between the investment in learning and 
the level of feedstock production.  This correlation allows for determination of under-
investment in learning on the part of grower.  The final part of the analysis identifies a 
positive correlation at the optimum between the investment in capital with the learning 
investment and feedstock production schedule.  This correlation completes the analysis 
with the determination that there is also underinvestment in capital on the part of the 
processor.  
Proposition 1.  For a given level of capital investment, the optimal limited-liability 
contracts elicits underproduction of the intermediate good in all states of nature, 
except for the most favorable.   
 
The analysis begins with a comparison of crop production levels between the two 
regimes through rearrangement of equation (9).  Equation (9) states that the optimal 
contract will elicit production of q for each θ such that the following holds: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) θθθθθθ ∀=Φ+−=∂
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represents the wedge that exists between the optimal production level that occurs in the 
first best and the optimal level that occurs under contracting.   The level of feedstock is 
chosen so that the marginal value product of the input equals the marginal cost of 
producing the input plus the wedge term, which may be thought of as the marginal cost of 
mitigating moral hazard in the learning investment and adverse selection in the input’s 
production.  This additional cost term creates a distortion between the level of feedstock 
that would be selected under first best conditions and that chosen under limited liability 
contracts. 
In order to ascertain if there is too much or little of the feedstock produced 
relative to the first best, one must first determine the sign of this “wedge” term.  First, 
restrictions are imposed. To ensure a separating equilibrium, we assume that the 
expression within the brackets of the wedge term is monotonic in the state of nature.  
Evaluating the expressions at the worst and best states of nature, one finds the following: 
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1,0 , and so must be positive for the entire range of values in [ ]θθ , . In 
addition, assumptions on the cost function impose C12(q,θ)<0.  Monotonicity, combined 
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with assumptions on the cost function and the distribution of θ allow us to state that 
( )e,θΦ is weakly negative for all values of θ . It is strictly negative for all θ except 
θ (the best state of nature), where it is equal to zero.  This implies that, for a given level 
of K, the optimal contract will elicit underproduction of q in all realized states of nature 
except the most favorable. 
Proposition 2. For a given level of capital investment, limited liability contracts elicit 
underinvestment in learning on the part of the grower.  
 
It is now determined if the levels of capital investment and learning effort differ 
between the two regimes.  In order to extend the analysis in this manner, equation (9) is 
first solved qualitatively for the second-best levels of crop production given K and e.  
That is, we must determine and expression for feedstock as a function of the ex ante 
investment levels and the revealed state of nature: ( )θ;, eKq .  To facilitate comparisons 
between the first best and second-best levels of investment and production, we denote 
first best levels by an asterisk (*) and second-best levels by a tilde (~) and define 
( ) ( )θθ ;~,~~and,** eKqqKqq ≡≡ .   
Consider the grower’s learning investment decision. A qualitative analysis of the 
level of investment as compared to the first best may be done via inspection of equation 
(3), the first-order condition for grower investment in the first best.  Differentiation of the 
constraint by ( )θq  and by e results in the following expressions (13). 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
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The two conditions in (13) imply that there is a positive correlation between feedstock 
production and learning investment at the optimum.  In order for the condition (3) to hold 
with equality, an increase in production must be accompanied by a corresponding 
increase in investment in learning.  Because it has already been determined that the 
optimal contract elicits underproduction (relative to the first best) for a given K in nearly 
all states of nature, then (13) implies that the contract elicits a corresponding level of 
investment in learning that is less than that of the first best for a given K.  In other words, 
if the second-best level of investment in capital were equal to the first best ( *~ KK = ), 
then there would be underproduction of feedstock ( *~ qq < ) and under-investment in 
learning relative to the first best ( *~ ee < ).   
Proposition 3. Limited liability contracts elicit underproduction in processing 
capacity on the part of the principal.  
Now consider the final piece of this puzzle, the processor’s investment in capital.  
In order to determine the relationship between *and~ KK we must analyze the first-order 
condition for capital investment in the first best.  Similar to the analysis of the grower 
decision, we may differentiate condition (2) by the investment and production variables. 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
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The set of conditions (14) rules out the case where *~ KK = , *~ qq < , and *~ ee < .  
The first two expressions of (14) imply that increases in both learning investment and 
feedstock production must also be accompanied by an increase in capital investment.  
Therefore, when q~  and e~  are less than the first best, then K~ must also be less than the 
first best for condition (2) to hold at equality.  Therefore, second-best levels of 
investment in both capital and learning are inefficient relative to the first best.  For any 
given level of capital investment, there will be under-investment in learning and 
underproduction of feedstock relative to the first best.  Due to the expectation that overall 
levels of feedstock and learning will be low, the processor under-invests in capital, and so 
the second-best project scale is smaller than the first best. 
Intuitively, the problem of under-investment in learning within the industry 
occurs because the processor must pay an information rent to the grower for production 
of the intermediate good.  As shown in the analysis, the information rent is directly 
related to the amount of learning-induced cost reductions that occur in a given state of 
nature.  In order to elicit truthful revelation, and induce investment in learning, the 
processor must pay these so-called learning rents to the grower.  As a result, the 
feedstock price to the processor remains relatively high as compared to the first best, 
despite cost reductions that occur due to learning.   
Better states of nature correspond to greater magnitudes of learning-induced cost 
reductions.  Better states of nature also correspond to larger payments of learning rent to 
the grower.  In order to elicit greater production in better states of nature the processor 
must make it unattractive for a low cost producer to mimic a high cost producer.  This 
requires the processor to pay larger bonus payments in the form of learning rents in better 
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states of nature. The increasing size of the learning rent increases the overall cost of 
feedstock to the processor.  To compensate for the increasing magnitude of learning rent 
in better states of nature, the processor reduces the feedstock procured in all states of 
nature except for the best.  The distortion between first best and second best levels of 
feedstock production decreases monotonically in magnitude from a maximum in the 
worst state of nature to zero in the best state. 
To some extent, the problem of moral hazard in learning investment reduces the 
size of the wedge between first best and second best feedstock output.  This can be 
verified by examining the wedge term, ( )e,θΦ .  One element of this term represents the 
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.  The term related to moral hazard is negative, 
whereas the term related to adverse selection is positive.  Because the wedge term is 
positive, the moral hazard distortion serves to reduce the size of the wedge and the 
adverse selection distortion serves to increase the size of the wedge.  The size of the 
wedge in feedstock production is directly related to the size of the learning rent given to 
the grower.  To overcome adverse selection, the processor pays learning rent to the 
grower.  In order to reduce the expected burden arising from payment of learning rent, 
the processor reduces the amount of feedstock procured in each state of nature, except the 
best.  However, the processor adjusts the reduction in feedstock production in order to 
induce investment in learning by the grower. 
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 Overall, the processor expects to pay a higher price for the feedstock than would 
have been paid in a first best situation. As a result, capital investment becomes less 
attractive to the processor relative to the first best, and so the processor invests in a 
smaller facility.  The smaller facility requires less feedstock.  Reduced orders for 
feedstock production reduce the size of the payments to growers in all states of nature.  
The reduced expected compensation diminishes the incentives for growers to invest in 
learning, resulting in higher costs of production for the feedstock. 1   
Implications for New Agricultural Industries 
 The model clearly shows that limited liability contracts do not achieve a first best 
solution.   Under limited liability contracts, growers are compensated for production costs 
and opportunity costs, and are given a bonus payment representing learning rent.  Thus, 
limited liability contracts increase the total price of the intermediate good to the 
processor.  To reduce the expected cost of the feedstock, the processor reduces contract 
orders for the procurement of the intermediate good, as well as the size of the capital 
investment.  Reduced orders for feedstock production diminish the overall power of the 
contracts by reducing incentives for growers to invest in learning.  The ultimate result is a 
project that is smaller in scale than that which would arise under the first best.  
This result has a number of implications for new agricultural industries.  Limited-
liability contracts have the effect of ensuring project participation on the part of growers, 
which assures the processor a source for the intermediate good.  However, the higher cost 
for the feedstock that results from this arrangement will affect the profitability of the 
project.  If the processor produces a final good in a competitive market, the project may 
                                                 
1 A similar result may be found using a first-order Taylor approximation around the first best of the set of 
first-order conditions.  The analysis has been suppressed from this draft to conserve space. 
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not be viable.  This high cost of feedstock may also discourage processors from investing 
in the biomass project and selecting a more conventional means of production that does 
not require a biomass crop.   The new industry may not get off the ground, which may 
deprive some rural communities of a means for economic development. Certain 
environmental benefits may also not be realized. 
Perhaps other contractual arrangements are possible that allow for assurances to 
both the grower and processor that would induce greater investment in these new 
industries.  Future research in this area is necessary to determine the efficacy of other 
contract forms and coordination schemes on the scale and viability of new agricultural 
projects.  For example, a possible topic for research would examine the performance of 
an ex post contract, i.e. a contract or menu of contracts that is offered after investments 
are made.  It has been shown that ex ante limited liability contracts offer the grower 
incentives for investment in learning.  However, they also increase the expense to the 
processor of the intermediate good.  Would an ex post contract reduce the price paid for 
the feedstock while reducing the incentives for learning? Is there an overall increase or 
decrease in the efficiency of investments and production levels?   Perhaps other 
commitment devices would lead to efficiency gains.  Would anything be gained by the 
processor acting as a Stackelberg leader and making investments before offering 
contracts to the grower?   
A first best solution may be achievable in a perfectly competitive market for the 
intermediate good.  Under perfect competition, growers would offer the intermediate 
good at marginal cost of production, thereby revealing the level of learning that has 
occurred.  Competition would also create the appropriate incentives for growers to invest 
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in learning.  In new agricultural industries, such as the biomass for electricity generation 
industry, a perfectly competitive environment does not exist.  The need for specific 
investments on the part of growers and processors, among other features of the industry, 
necessitate long-term contracts.  Furthermore, the location specificity of the investments 
that restrict the market area of an individual project could prohibit the formation of 
competition once the markets for biomass feedstock become more developed. 
Repeated interactions between the processor and the grower may offer a solution 
to the problem of industry viability.  After the industry has been established, then there 
may be potential for a processor to extract more of the rents from learning, thereby 
increasing the value of capital investment.  Oftentimes, crop rotation schedules will be 
shorter than the planning horizon of the processor. As such, there may be several 
contracting periods over the lifespan of a processing facility.  In subsequent contracting 
periods, processors may be able to elicit information about cost reductions through a 
competitive bidding process. Allowing new growers to enter in the bidding process may 
force incumbent growers to bid truthfully, enabling the processor to extract learning rents 
from the less efficient growers.  If a processor could be relatively certain that a 
competitive bid process could be implemented successfully, then perhaps they may be 
willing to invest greater resources into the industry.  Successful implementation of a 
competitive bidding process requires freedom of entry of new growers into the process.  
Entry may be limited due to transportation costs that restrict the expanse of the growing 
area. Established grower cooperatives may also restrict new membership.  This may be a 
fruitful avenue for future research. 
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Vertical integration within the industry offers another potential solution to the 
problem of industry viability.  However, vertical integration does not come without 
another, and potentially more significant, set of problems. Williamson theorized that a 
decision on organizational form would involve a trade-off between potential 
diseconomies of vertical integration and costs of transacting in the marketplace.  For 
many new agricultural industries, diseconomies of backward vertical integration 
(processor acquiring grower) may occur due to geographical reasons.  Large processing 
facilities require vast tracts of land for crop production.  The processor would require a 
team of grower-managers to oversee crop production.  Here, the situation is identical to 
the original contracting problem with moral hazard and adverse selection.  The processor 
will need to offer a wage contract identical to that under contracting – a base pay with 
bonuses for better outcomes – resulting in an inefficient industry. The problem may not 
be solved by backward integration. 
Another scenario may be forward vertical integration where a cooperative of 
growers invests in processing technology.  Under the information structure, forward 
vertical integration enables the growers to internalize both investment decisions – capital 
and learning – and appropriate all of the returns from those investments. A first best 
solution may be achievable if the expected profitability of the industry is greater than the 
grower’s outside option.  Problems may arise, however, when industry profits turn out to 
be lower than expected, particularly if growers require a government bailout from a failed 
biomass project.  
Forward vertical integration offers a number of possible extensions to the 
research.  In particular, are the incentives within a cooperative sufficient to induce 
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efficient levels of learning and appropriate levels of feedstock?  Will project size differ 
under a vertically integrated industry from the limited liability contract outcome?  How 
will grower risk aversion affect the project under forward vertical integration?  
Subsequent chapters of the dissertation explore in greater depth the issues concerning 
alternative contracting arrangements, coordination schemes, and vertical integration in 
new agricultural industries.  The discussion is placed in the context of the biomass for 
electricity generation industry.  Examination of this specific industry allows for clearer 
insight into the implications of the theoretical model.  
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Chapter 4.  The Case of Biomass for Electricity Generation 
The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 may be applied to a whole class of 
new industries.  Many new agricultural industries exhibit the requisite features: two-sided 
specific investments, the prospect for cost reductions through learning, uncertainty in 
outcomes, and the potential need to minimize the risk to the producer of the intermediate 
good.  This chapter presents a case study of a specific industry: the use of closed-loop 
biomass for electricity generation.   
Biomass electricity production holds the promise of a sustainable, environment-
friendly energy source and a means for rural economic development.  Biomass for 
electricity generation has garnered increased interest in recent years as a means of 
reducing carbon dioxide emissions and replacing a diminishing fossil fuel supply.  When 
grown in a sustainable manner, biomass is a renewable energy resource that results, at 
worst, in no net emission of greenhouse gases and may well result in a net reduction in 
atmospheric carbon due to sequestration in roots (Bransby, Mclaughlin, and Parrish 
1998).  In addition, biomass energy systems offer other potential environmental and 
economic benefits, such as protection of watersheds and highly erodible agricultural 
lands, creation of new markets for agricultural products and revitalization of rural 
economies (Graham, Lichtenberg, Roningen, Shapouri, and Walsh 1995).  
Biomass energy plantations serve a dual role in the reduction of carbon emissions.  
There will be a direct reduction in greenhouse gases through substitution of fossil fuels in 
electricity production and there will be an indirect reduction in emissions through the 
increase in ability of agricultural land to sequester carbon. Biomass energy initiatives 
may be helpful in bridging the gap between European Union and United States over 
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international agreements on carbon gas emissions.  Perennial crops used for biomass 
power, like switchgrass and willow trees, provide year-round vegetative cover.  As a 
result, they protect against soil erosion and prevent watershed deterioration.  Energy 
crops are also resistant against floods.  In the aftermath of the Mississippi River floods of 
1993, there has been controversy concerning the use of land in the flood plain for 
agricultural purposes. Conversion of the flood plain to perennial energy crops could 
relieve tension over the management of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers.  
The presence of relationship-specific assets and intertemporal considerations such 
as the frequency and duration of the relationships between energy crop growers and 
electricity generators necessitate the formation of long-term contractual relationships.  
Growers are not likely to begin production of energy crops without the assurance that a 
generation facility will be built, and generators are not likely to construct a facility 
without the assurance that growers will produce energy crops.  After an agreement is 
made to form a biomass electricity generation system, a significant amount of time passes 
before production of electricity occurs.  The generating facility must be constructed and, 
in most cases, the energy crops take several years to reach the level of maturity necessary 
for use as fuel input. During this phase, growers dedicate all their physical and human 
assets to the production of crops that likely have little value to any other user than the 
generator. In addition, any experience gained in the production of energy crops may have 
little or no value to other industries and may not be transferable to the production of other 
crops.  In addition, the bulkiness of energy crops results in high costs of transportation of 
biomass. These costs comprise a significant portion of the costs of production of 
electricity using energy crops and limit the distance that can exist between the generators 
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and the growers (Larson & Marrison, Marrison and Larson).  Due to the need to 
minimize transportation costs, the generating facility must be located in close proximity 
to the growers of energy crops. As in many electricity-generating technologies, 
production also exhibits a certain degree of increasing returns to scale.  This implies that 
for biomass, a trade-off exists between economies of scale in production and 
diseconomies of scale in transportation. 
In addition to site specificity, the generators’ technology may be characterized by 
a high degree of physical asset specificity.  Biomass may be used in one of several 
manners to generate electricity, from simple co-firing with coal to a more complex 
process of gasification with a combined-cycle generation.  As the technology becomes 
more complex along this spectrum, capital costs and thermal efficiency increase.  Yet, the 
technology also becomes more specialized in terms of being less able to accept fuel other 
than biomass.  In simpler technologies, a relatively small capital investment is required 
on the part of the generator and biomass and fossil fuels act as near-perfect substitutes.  
In more complex technologies, the use of biomass requires specially designed turbines 
made of unconventional materials. Although it may be theoretically possible for a 
generator to use natural gas in a system designed for biomass, such a substitution cannot 
be made without loss in engineering efficiency and resulting loss in competitiveness. 
Many crops used for the production of electricity are perennial crops that require 
a period of two to five years of cultivation to reach a level of maturity necessary for use 
as a fuel input. This implies that an agreement to generate electricity via biomass must be 
made years before actual production commences in order to assure adequate supply of 
feedstock.  In addition, electricity generation requires a significant investment in physical 
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capital.  Typically, a productive lifetime of thirty to forty years is required to recoup the 
costs of investment.  The generator must therefore arrange for fuel supply over a long 
period of time.  On the part of the grower, energy crop production exists in cycles of 
seven years (switchgrasses) to fifteen years (poplars and willows). It is likely that 
generators will wish to forge relationships with growers that extend over several crop 
production cycles. 
In general, the current costs of producing biomass have been too high to elicit 
significant investment in this industry on the part of generators.  However, learning-by-
doing will play an important role in the development of biomass electricity feedstock 
production.  Energy planners often cite the important role that learning-by-doing will 
have on the ability of renewable energy technologies to compete with fossil fuel 
technologies in the long run.   
Graham et al.’s (1995) estimates of crop yields and production costs over the next 
twenty years show the potential value of learning to the emerging industry.  A modest 
program in research and development is expected to increase switchgrass yields in the 
North Central region by 14% in 2005 and 42% in 2020.  These values correspond to 
decreases in production costs of 10% in 2005 and 24% in 2020.  In monetary terms, 
switchgrass production costs could drop from $3.15 per gigajoule (GJ) in 2000 to $2.84 
in 2005 and $2.39 in 20202.   In comparison, the average price for natural gas to electric 
utilities has ranged from about $2.41 per GJ in 1999 to about $4.00 per GJ in 2000 
(Energy Information Administration 2001b).   
Much of the learning with perennial crops used in energy production is likely to 
occur during the establishment phase.  This learning will be site-specific and depend 
                                                 
2 All monetary values expressed in 2001 U.S. dollars. 
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greatly on the management of the growers involved.  Sanderson et al. (1996) report that 
failure to quickly establish a productive stand of switchgrass within 1 year of seeding 
reduces the viability of using the crop as an energy feedstock.  They cite planting 
methods as an important factor contributing to stand failures.  Other biomass energy 
crops, such as willow and poplar, have been shown to be especially susceptible to early 
establishment practices (Downing and Graham, Wright.)  Measures to control weeds and 
pests will be especially important and may be very specific to regions or individual fields 
(Wright.) Although switchgrass is generally considered a resilient crop that is able to 
grow on marginal lands, it has been shown to be responsive to fertilizer applications and 
sensitive to the timing and application of fertilizer and pesticides. 
A number of U.S. government agencies, particularly the Departments of 
Agriculture and Energy, are already involved in efforts at promoting the use of biomass 
for electricity generation through the Biobased Products and Bioenergy Initiative3.  The 
initiative has resulted in a number of joint ventures involving industry, government, 
farming and research organizations to fund research, development and demonstration 
projects for bioenergy systems. Examples of these ventures include The Salix 
Consortium, comprised of over twenty organizations, that aims to establish willow tree 
energy crop plantations in the upper Midwest and Northeastern regions of the country; 
and the Chariton Valley Biomass Project that aims to establish a market for switchgrass 
to support a 35 mega-watt electric generation facility in South Central Iowa.  The 
initiative was formed by executive order in 1999 to triple the use of bio-based products 
                                                 
3 Participating federal agencies also include the Departments of the Interior, Commerce and Treasury, the 
National Science Foundation, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Office of Science Technology and 
Policy, the Office of the Federal Environmental Executive, the Office of Management and Budget, and the 
Tennessee Valley Authority. 
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and bioenergy in the United States by 2010, with the goal of expanding economic and 
trade opportunities for agricultural producers. 
These projects typically rely on short-term and long-term contracts between 
growers and processors.  The contracts in use by these projects have been designed 
primarily to induce grower participation.  Typical energy crops, such as switchgrass and 
willow trees, are perennial and require more than one growing season to reach maturity 
before they are viable for use in electricity generation.  Growers have therefore been 
hesitant to commit land for up to ten years to a crop that has no alternative use and that 
creates no return on investment before the second or third year of growth.  As a result, 
contracts offer a number of provisions to the growers that include partial to full 
reimbursement of crop establishment costs, minimum crop price guarantees, as well as a 
share of the energy tax credits accrued by the utility for renewable energy production. 
Utilities involved in these projects have thus far limited their use of biomass to 
direct combustion in conjunction with another fuel, such as coal.  This requires a modest 
investment to modify existing capital to accommodate the use of biomass in generation 
facilities.  Significant improvements in the energy conversion efficiency of biomass, and 
hence reductions in marginal cost of generation, may be attained through the use of more 
sophisticated technologies which, in contrast to co-firing, require a substantial investment 
on the part of utilities in relationship-specific capital. These new technologies, such as 
gasification of energy crop hybrids, are likely to place biomass on a more competitive 
level with traditional fossil fuels (Larson and Marrison, Paisley and Anson). 
The arrangements between generators and growers will affect the extent of 
learning that will occur and, therefore, the magnitude of future cost reductions in the 
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industry.  This suggests that the organization of biomass electricity systems will 
determine the ability of the industry to compete in the long term.  Several researchers 
have pointed out the potential problems of organizing the new industry as a potential 
obstacle to the creation of a viable biomass electricity sector (Costello and Finnell, Rösch 
and Kaltschmitt, Roos et al.).  To date, there has been no serious discussion in the 
literature about the possible structure of the biomass electricity industry and the impact 
that various structures may have on costs of production, investment decisions (including 
those pertaining to production experience, i.e. learning), and economic efficiency. 
The estimates by Graham et al. suggest that it may be optimal for a risk-neutral 
agent to invest in a large scale biomass generation facility several years before the costs 
of producing the crops falls below current fossil fuel prices.  This would be true if the 
investor had the ability to make all investment and production decisions, and so is able to 
appropriate the gains from learning.  However, in a contractual environment described 
above, where some of the investment decisions are unobservable and the resulting cost 
reductions are unverifiable, then it may be impossible for the generator to appropriate any 
of these rents.  In some cases, it may be optimal for the generator to not invest in biomass 
technology at all.    
Current predictions about the industry based on these analyses may be too 
optimistic. Consider the feasibility analyses of the biomass for electricity industry.  Many 
of these analyses (Graham et al., Larson & Marrison) assume some form of cost 
reductions will occur on the part of switchgrass production.  In their models, the 
reductions come from exogenous research and development programs.  A fundamental 
flaw of these models is the assumption that the transfer of R & D to the growers will 
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costless and fully assimilated.   The ability to substitute private learning by the grower 
with public R & D will be constrained by the heterogeneity that exists in agriculture.  The 
conditions for agricultural production vary considerably from site to site.  Agriculture is 
site-specific due to the variations in climate and resource quality, which makes 
agricultural production highly dependent on management. (Lichtenberg)  Advances in 
plant sciences and genetics may bring about cost reductions in biomass production 
through the introduction of new crop hybrids and cropping techniques.  However, 
learning in new agricultural industries is also likely to be site specific, and so the transfer 
public sector learning will require effort on the part of the growers to modify and adapt 
the knowledge to their particular conditions and experience. 
In addition, the development of supply curves (Graham et al.) based on expected 
cost reductions assumes that growers will pass cost reductions on to the processor.  This 
only occurs under certain conditions with perfect competition.  The salient features of 
biomass electricity generation throw doubt upon the ability of this industry to develop a 
competitive market for biomass fuel.  As described earlier, the need for specific 
investments, the geographic limitations imposed by transportation costs, and the need to 
offer assurances of future trade between processors and growers all point to an industry 
arranged around long-term contracts that restrict the potential for competition between 
growers.   Long-term contracts for biomass supply imply that the cost reductions may not 
be costlessly passed on to the processor.   
The theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 illustrates the difficulties inherent in 
contracting for an industry with the characteristics of biomass for electricity generation.   
To summarize, limited liability arrangements offer assurances to the grower in the form 
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of minimum payments and to the processor in the form of guaranteed feedstock supply. 
However, these assurances come at the cost of reduced project scale and inefficient levels 
of investment in learning.  Overall, the project that arises from a limited liability 
arrangement may be too small to and costly to be viable.  These arrangements pose an 
obstacle to the success of new agricultural industries. 
Currently, a wide assortment of arrangements exists between processors and 
growers for new biomass electricity projects.4  Some of these arrangements are 
essentially limited liability contracts.  Other arrangements force growers to take on some 
risk.  However, many of these arrangements will exhibit some elements of moral hazard 
and adverse selection that result in sub-optimal investment and production decisions.  
Learning effort on the part of growers will be restrained, ultimately affecting the viability 
of the industry.  The following paragraphs describe various elements of the biomass 
energy project arrangements and how these elements may impinge upon the viability of 
the industry.   These include the use of contracts linked to participation in the 
Conservation Reserve Program; the use of bonuses for early adopters and rewards for 
productivity; the use of stiff penalties for contract breach; the use of minimum price for 
the feedstock; and the use of production quotas based on share ownership in a grower 
cooperative. 
 Many biomass projects now operate under some form a limited liability 
arrangement.  One example of this is the set of producers that have contracts linked to 
participation in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP).  Under the CRP, growers take 
land out of production for conservation.  They then receive a payment related to the 
opportunity cost.  Biomass projects like Chariton Valley have enlisted farmers in CRP.  
                                                 
4 This discussion is based on correspondence with Dr. Mark Downing of Oak Ridge National Laboratories. 
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In the contracts, CRP growers are allowed to sell switchgrass in exchange for forgoing 
part of the CRP payment.  It is likely that these farmers will only choose to harvest and 
sell switchgrass if the price of switchgrass exceeds the CRP payment.  This implies that 
growers will only participate when reimbursed opportunity cost, as well as production 
costs. 
 In one set of agreements, growers are paid bonuses to enlist in a project (“early 
adopter” bonuses, guaranteed reversion costs, and are rewarded for productivity.  Early 
adopter bonuses may encourage those that expect lower costs in the future to join projects 
first.  However, it is not clear if these bonuses lead to incentives to exert effort that 
increase the probability of cost reductions.   Do these bonuses only encourage those 
growers of initial high ability to enroll in the projects? Do they encourage lower ability 
growers to enroll and then invest in learning?  Greater detail of this arrangement is 
necessary to determine the effect of these bonuses.  If, for example, the bonuses are 
meted out by a competitive process, they may induce efficient investment in learning. 
Most agreements within the new industry, even those that force the grower to take 
on some of the risk, reimburse 50% or more of the establishment costs to the grower.  
One set of agreements guarantees reimbursement of reversion costs, the cost of reverting 
production out of energy crop production.  In a sense, these reimbursements reduce the 
risk taken on by the farmer by mitigating the effect of specific investments.  Specific 
investments lock agents into a relationship.  By removing some of the costs of the 
specific investment, a grower may experience less apprehension at joining biomass 
projects.  However, the reduction of risk to the grower increases the problem of moral 
hazard in learning investment and may lead to inefficient exertion of learning effort.   
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Another set of agreements sets a minimum level of effort in cultivation and 
harvesting, as well as severe penalties for breaking with the contract.   Yet, establishing a 
minimum amount of effort does not necessarily induce optimal effort.    A penalty for 
contract breach, however, should have a positive effect on the learning investment in that 
it increases the risk to the grower of realizing a poor state of nature, or high costs of 
production.  If the grower realizes a high cost of producing the feedstock, she may wish 
to renege on the agreement and leave the biomass project.  The penalty increases the cost 
of reneging and encourages the grower to take actions that increase the probability of 
realizing low costs of production. 
Rewarding for productivity may also elicit greater learning effort, but how is this 
implemented?  A reward for productivity implies the need to elicit truthful revelation on 
the part of the grower through her choice of payment and quantity in a contract menu.  
This is similar to a mechanism used to overcome adverse selection.  This mechanism 
causes much of the distortion between first and second best outcomes described by the 
theory.  Therefore, the rewards for productivity translate to learning rent that increases 
the price of the feedstock to the grower.  The increased price reduces feedstock quantity 
procured, which reduces incentives to invest in processing capacity, which reduces 
incentives to invest in learning. 
Focus groups conducted in Florida reveal that utilities prefer to conduct business 
with a cooperative of growers and have no desire to pursue supply agreements with 
individual growers.  Growers, in turn, have no desire to invest in biomass without a long 
term agreement.  Currently, growers supplying eucalyptus and other tree materials to a 
Florida utility are paid a price linked to the price of fossil fuels, biomass quality, and 
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renewable energy subsidies.  The agreement only appears to limit liability to the grower 
cooperative with a minimum price for the feedstock.  However, the utility has made no 
significant investment in biomass specific technology.  It is unclear how much biomass is 
being used in this project or how many growers are involved.   
Despite the variety of arrangements within the industry, there appears to be one 
common element of these projects.  The projects all seem to be characterized by small 
levels of investment in specific assets on the part of the processors.  Most utilities that 
employ biomass for the generation of electricity use a co-firing technology.  These 
technologies allow the utility the ability to burn biomass in conjunction with another fuel, 
such as coal.  The utilities, therefore, enjoy a luxury of flexibility in the use of input fuel.  
Engineering analyses, however, suggest that greater conversion efficiencies for biomass 
fuel, and therefore lower marginal costs of production for electricity, are achievable with 
more sophisticated gasification technologies.  These sophisticated technologies require a 
greater amount of specific investment by the processor.  Part of the reason for this lack of 
investment rests in uncertainty about the technology.  However, part of the reason rests 
on the high cost of biomass feedstock relative to fossil fuels.  Perhaps if generators could 
expect a greater degree of cost reductions in biomass feedstock, they would be less 
hesitant to invest in large-scale biomass-specific generation technology.  Current 
agreements may not be sufficient to ensure that generators appropriate the gains from 
grower learning. 
The potential for backward vertical integration to resolve the problem of 
underinvestment may be limited within the biomass electricity industry.  The industry is 
likely to be characterized by diseconomies of backward vertical integration (generator 
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acquiring grower) due to geographical reasons.  As an example, consider a 100 mega-
watt (MW) generating facility using gasification technology.  Calculations using 
published estimates of switchgrass yields (Turhollow 1994) and technical efficiencies 
(Larson and Marrison 1997) suggest that 50,000 to 150,000 acres of land would be 
needed to produce the energy crops to supply a power plant.  This large plantation 
requires an enormous amount of management effort.  Based on the average size of a farm 
in Iowa of 300 to 500 acres, the firm could potentially require 100 to 200 crop managers 
and operators.  In a world where employees are guaranteed a minimum wage, the firm is 
likely to encounter similar problems of moral hazard and adverse selection between firm 
management and farm employee as could be encountered between processor and grower. 
 The use of cooperatives in more than one project suggests the possibility of 
forward vertical integration within the industry.  Perhaps, a cooperative producing energy 
crops may decide at a future date to take on the processing phase of production.  At this 
point, the cooperative may choose to invest in a suitable biomass-specific technology to 
increase the value of their energy crop production.   
There appears to be one encouraging development in the industry in the area of 
cooperatives. In one project, the growers purchase shares in a cooperative.  Each grower 
is then allowed to sell a quantity of biomass proportional to the number of shares owned 
in the cooperative.  The price at which they sell the biomass is fixed in any given year, 
yet negotiable annually.  Buying shares in the cooperative allows growers to take on 
some of the risk associated with these projects.  By linking the quantity to be delivered to 
the amount of shares purchase, growers may be forced to compete with each other to 
enter the market.  Growers with the ability to reduce costs will be able to buy more 
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shares, or pay a higher price for those shares.  The need to recoup the cost of the shares 
then induces exertion of learning effort.    
Future research is needed on the issue of forward vertical integration and grower 
cooperatives.  Perhaps these organizations create the proper incentives needed to induce 
investment in learning within the industry, as well as allow the industry to reap the full 
marginal benefit of this learning investment. However, more research is needed to 
determine if and how these vertically integrated cooperatives would be able to overcome 
the same obstacles facing the industry.  In particular, how will vertical integration 
mitigate the risk aversion growers currently have toward enrolling in these biomass 
projects?  
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Chapter 5.  Empirical Model 
This chapter describes the construction of an empirical counterpart to the 
theoretical model developed in Chapter 3.  To illustrate the impact of limited liability 
contracts on the viability of new agricultural industries, an empirical model simulates the 
investment and production decisions and outcomes from an emerging agricultural 
industry: biomass for electricity industry.  As described earlier, several projects are 
currently underway to establish biomass electricity as a new market for agricultural 
producers, particularly in the North Central and Southeastern regions of the United 
States.  The basis for the simulation in this and the subsequent chapter arises from on-
going efforts in the Chariton Valley of Iowa to establish a sustainable biomass electricity 
project using local growers to produce switchgrass.   
Current analyses of projects like Chariton Valley implicitly assume that growers 
will only participate in these projects if they are reimbursed for production and 
opportunity costs (Brummer et al.)  This assumption suggests the use of limited liability 
contractual arrangements within the industry.  Indeed, there is evidence from a survey of 
Florida landowners that they would not be willing to invest in biomass production unless 
they are assured of the availability of markets and granted some certainty about the costs 
of production and returns.  Contracts in Chariton Valley are linked to the Conservation 
Reserve Program (CRP).  The CRP offers incentives to growers to not harvest crops on 
their land.  This incentive equates to the opportunity cost of land to the landowner.  
Under the contract, growers are allowed to harvest and to sell switchgrass in exchange for 
a portion of the CRP payments.  Due to the assurance of the CRP payments, growers are 
likely only to sell switchgrass if the payment exceeds the CRP payment.  In spirit, this is 
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a limited liability contract for the production of switchgrass.  The policy of 
reimbursement of all costs incurred by the grower constitutes a limited liability 
agreement between the processor and grower.  Therefore, the biomass electricity serves 
as an excellent candidate for the empirical application of the theoretical model. 
Data from the Chariton Valley project allows for reasonable approximations of 
feedstock production costs, transportation costs, and opportunity costs to growers.  This 
data also allows for estimation of switchgrass yields, as well as storage costs and losses.   
Data from the engineering literature allows for estimation of capital investment costs and 
energy conversion efficiencies.  The scenario for the simulation posits a wholesale 
electricity producer siting a facility in the North Central United States.  The producer 
wishes to invest in biomass gasification technology for use with an energy crop suitable 
for cultivation in the region: switchgrass.  The processor chooses investment in capacity 
as a best response to the grower’s investment in learning.  For the analysis, trade occurs 
between processor and grower under a limited-liability agreement.  Each of the sections 
below discusses segment of the theoretical model in terms of its empirical counterpart.   
The Processor 
The construction begins with elements of the model that pertain to the processor:  
the production function for electricity generation, cost function for the capital investment, 
and cost function for the transportation of biomass fuel to the facility. 
Production function for electricity generation 
The engineering literature primarily relies on a fixed proportions technology to 
represent the generation of electricity.  This representation, however, is not suitable for 
the present analysis since it does not allow for variability in the choice of the amount of 
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generation capacity used at any given point in time.  Additionally, a fixed proportions 
technology does not meet the necessary conditions for the theoretical model.  In 
particular, it is not differentiable at all levels of capital (K) and feedstock (q). 
A quadratic representation of the processor technology was chosen for a number 
of reasons.  The quadratic production function (15) is a flexible functional form.  In 
addition, within appropriate ranges for capital and feedstock, the quadratic form 
accurately predicts output from various levels of capital and feedstock, allows for 
replication of results from the literature when engineering assumptions are imposed, and 
allows for tractable analysis of the theoretical model in both the first best and contracting 
scenarios.5  Also, the form selected implies that both inputs, capital and feedstock, are 





321),( ααααα ++++=    (15) 
Data from the engineering literature concerning the conversion efficiency of 
existing biomass facilities in Europe (Dornburg) allow for a determination of the 
parameters (α) of the production function.  The conversion efficiency was used to 
determine the electricity that can be produced from various levels of capital and 
feedstock.  A Leontief  production function (16) was used to determine the output of 
electricity from approximately 6000 pairs of capital and feedstock levels.  
},max{ qKy ζη=        (16) 
                                                 
5 Other functional forms were explored for use in the simulation.  These include the constant 
elasticity of substitution, transcendental logarithm, quadratic, and Mitscherliche-Baule functional forms (a 
differentiable form that exhibits a production plateau.)  Some of these form led to expressions that could 
not be inverted for solving first-order conditions.  Others led to expressions that when combined with a 
probability distribution could not be solved for expected values. 
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In the production function (16), η and ξ  represent conversion factors accounting for the 
engineering efficiency of the technology, total hours of operation, and the energy content 
of switchgrass.  Engineering efficiency of the technology varies with the level of capital 
and ranges from a low of 32% conversion of biomass energy to electricity at 10 MW, to a 
high of 44% at 170 MW.  Capital investment (K) varies from 10-megawatt (MW) 
capacity to 300 MW and for each level of K, feedstock (q) ranges from a level that would 
sustain the facility at 50% capacity usage to a level that surpasses capacity by 
approximately 40%.  The resulting set of inputs and outputs were fit to the quadratic form 
using ordinary least squares.   Parameter estimates from the quadratic fit are reported in 
Table 1.  The R2 for the estimation is about 0.995. 
Table 1. Regression results for Production Function 
  
Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-Statistic
α1 4.655 x 106 63998 72.7
α2 815.74 14.60 55.9 
α3 -35,757 398 -89.9 
α4 -0.00152 0.000013 -118.9 
α5 14.686 0.142 103.1 
 
 The parameters of the production function must be such that the following hold in 













In addition, the following verifies that the production function is concave and 




























Investment function for capital 
Larson and Marrison estimate the unit cost of generation capital6 per kilowatt 
(kW) of capacity, in 1994 US dollars, as: 
56.1471981400/$ −+= MWkW      (17) 
Adjusting to 2003 dollars using a GDP deflator for capital cost7 and annualizing using a 
capital charge rate equal to 0.101,8 the annualized cost of capital investment per 
megawatt (MW) of capacity (K) is: 
56.05576210141400)( −+= KKKr      (18) 
Equation (18) describes a technology that exhibits a form of increasing returns to scale.  
In this form, the model has difficulty converging on a reasonable solution.  Part of the 
difficulty is due to the non-integer exponent on capital in (18), and part of the difficulty is 
due to the increasing returns over the entire range of capital.  To correct this problem, a 
cubic form was selected that would facilitate calculation.  This form also limits increasing 
returns to select range of capital, exhibiting decreasing returns at higher levels of capital.   
Equation (18) is used to generate a set of points for a smoothing regression.  The cost 
equation was fit to an equation cubic in capital (K).  The final equation for the capital cost 
                                                 
6 Costs based on pressurized biomass integrated-gasifier/gas turbine combined cycle (HP BIG/GTCC) 
technology. 
7 The GDP deflator for capital cost is taken from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(http://www.jsc.nasa.gov/bu2/inflateGDP.html) and is equal to 1.1725. 
8 Larson and Marrison use a capital charge rate of 0.101, as suggested by the Electric Power Research 
Institute.  This rate assumes a utility-financed renewable energy power plant with a 30-year life, 6.2% real 
pretax discount rate, and 38% income tax. 
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is displayed below.  The adjusted R2 for the equation is 0.987. Standard errors for the 
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Transportation Costs for Feedstock 
The average cost of transporting feedstock from the production area to the 
generation facility increases with the size of the facility.  Consider a facility located at the 
center of a large area of farmland involved in feedstock production.  As the size of the 
facility increases, the radius of the production area increases.  As one moves outward 
from the facility, each successive ring of production contains greater amounts of 
farmland.  Therefore, an increase in the size of the facility necessarily increases the 
average distance of transport for each ton of feedstock.   
Current arrangements place the responsibility for transportation costs on the 
processor.   Several estimates for costs per ton per kilometer of travel exist in the 
literature.  Two of those estimates were considered for the analysis those from Larson & 
Marrison and those reported by the Chariton Valley Project (Brummer et al.)  In general, 
the transportation costs consist of a fixed cost and a variable cost.  The Larson & 
Marrison estimates appear to have a lower fixed cost portion and higher variable cost 
portion than those of the Chariton Valley reports.    
In the reasonable range of feedstock production for facilities ranging from 150 
MW to 300MW, the Chariton Valley estimates of cost are approximately 30-40% higher 
than Larson & Marrison.  However, Larson & Marrison costs are estimates based on 
reports in the engineering literature.  The Chariton Valley estimates are based on actual 
experiences with transporting switchgrass in Iowa.  Therefore, in order to present a more 
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realistic portrayal of the industry and to produce conservative estimates of the industry 
viability, the Chariton Valley reports of transportation costs were used for the simulation.     
The fixed and variable costs of transportation are determined using those values 
reported by the Chariton Valley Project coordinator:  $155 to $200 per trip, with sites 26 
to 66 miles from the facility.  Solving two equations with two unknowns results in an 
equation for the cost per metric tonne of feedstock as a function of distance (D) in 
kilometers. 
DtonneperCost 043.069.7 +=      (19) 
In order for the processor to use this formula in planning, she requires a 
relationship between size of the facility and distance for transportation.  French derives 
this relationship and estimates the average distance per unit of feedstock to a processor, 
assuming a uniform density of cultivation surrounding the facility and a rectangular grid 







qD =        (20) 
where, D is the average distance from the facility in kilometers,  q represents the total 
quantity of feedstock necessary to supply the processing facility in metric tonnes, and P0 
represents the planting density (yield) of the feedstock in tonnes/hectare.  Agronomic 
analyses report average yields of switchgrass in Iowa (Lemus et al.) to be approximately 
nine (9) tonnes per hectare. Combining equations (6) and (7), and converting to miles, 
acres, and short tons, results in: 
2/30004.00.7)( qqqT +=       (21) 
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Once again, to ensure reasonable tractability, the simulation uses a quadratic 
approximation of the relationship (21).  A linear regression of transportation costs on 
feedstock and the square of feedstock produces the equation for use in the simulation.  
Results from the regression are displayed below.  The adjusted R2 for the regression is 









The construction of the model continues with elements of the model that pertain 
to the grower:  the cost function for the production of switchgrass,  the probability of cost 
reductions due to learning effort, and the cost or disutility function of learning effort.  
Cost function for feedstock production 
Participants in the Chariton Valley Project have recently reported costs for the 
production of switchgrass.  These reported costs are high relative to previous estimates in 
the literature (Walsh and Graham). However, previous estimates are based primarily on 
experimental plot studies and so Chariton Valley estimates are likely to be a more 
accurate representation of true costs of producing switchgrass.  These estimates also 
allow for a conservative estimate of the viability of the industry. 
Walsh and Graham report estimated and actual yields of switchgrass on lands of 
varying quality in Iowa and the North Central Region of the US.  Recent analyses of crop 
yields from Iowa plots (Lemus et al.) correspond closely with previous yield estimates.  
Lemus et al. report switchgrass biomass yields from 1998 to 2001 ranging from 6.4 to 
11.8 tonnes per hectare, with a mean value of 9.0 tonnes per hectare. Walsh and Graham 
estimate a range of switchgrass yields for the North Central region which has an average 
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yield of about 9.4 tonnes per hectare.   Walsh and Graham yield estimates are used in the 
estimation of costs of switchgrass for two reasons: they are possibly more representative 
of the variability of growing conditions in the North Central region, and the average 
value does not differ greatly from those experienced recently in Iowa.  Walsh and 
Graham report greater variation of yields, which represent yields for a larger region 
(North Central) than those reported in Lemus et al.  This allows for a wider range in cost 
estimates to be used in calculating an average cost of production for the region.   
The basic cost function used in the simulation takes the following linear form: 
qcqC 0)( =  
where c0 represents the average cost of switchgrass production.  A linear cost function for 
crop production allows for the disentanglement of production costs and transportation 
costs for switchgrass delivery.  A strictly convex cost function implies that cost of 
production varies due to changes in land quality and opportunity costs.  Due to the 
importance of transportation costs, a ton of switchgrass produced on high quality land far 
from the generation facility may not be as expensive to produce as a ton produced on low 
quality land close to the facility.  Thus, determination of the delivered price of a 
particular ton of switchgrass requires knowledge of the distribution of land in a particular 
region.  A specific site has not been selected for this analysis and so the distribution of 
land quality is not known.   Therefore to keep the analysis applicable to more general 
region, a linear cost function has been used. 
To calculate the average price of switchgrass for the North Central region, the 
analysis employs a technique similar to that used by Graham et al in the estimation of a 
biomass supply curve. Graham et al. construct a supply curve for switchgrass biomass in 
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the North Central region.  They use data on land quality (land capability class), yields, 
production costs, and average rental rates of land as reported in the 12th sign-up of the 
CRP (Osborn et al.) to determine the quantity of switchgrass produced at a price that is 
competitive with other uses of the resources for production.  For the analysis of this 
dissertation, production costs and rental rates have been calibrated to those reported in 
Brummer et al.  For instance, 12th-signup CRP rental rates range in value from $10 to 
$125 per acre.  Brummer et al. reports rental rates for two qualities of land $185 and $123 
per hectare, or about $75 and $50 per acre.  The set of values in CRP sign-up were then 
adjusted proportionally so that he highest value would correspond with the high value 
reported by Brummer, so that the final range of rental rates was $6 to $75. Cost of 
production in the Chariton Valley report does not vary by land quality, and it equals 
about $176 per acre.  In addition, the analysis accounts for storage costs of $10 per ton of 
switchgrass to be stored at a centralized location that results in about 2% loss of biomass.  
Using the distribution of land and rental rates, an average cost for the Chariton Valley 
region, including opportunity costs, is $65.04 per ton of switchgrass, or c0 = $65.04.   
Probability of learning 
 As described in the theoretical model, the potential for learning in the production 
of feedstock may lead to reduced costs of production.  This is modeled as an investment 
in learning, representing extra effort expended on the part of the grower in observing crop 
progress, adapting agricultural techniques, implementing proper crop management, etc.  
Despite the additional effort, reduction in costs is not certain.  The expenditure of effort, 
however, makes it more likely that costs of production decline in the future. 
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 Representation of probabilistic cost reductions occurs through modification of the 
cost function (above) to include a state of the world, θ, that is randomly distributed.  
Distribution of θ depends on the level of effort, e, where higher values for e imply a 
lower probability that θ takes on a value corresponding to low levels of cost reduction.  
One functional form that offers a relatively simple representation of cost reduction under 
uncertainty is: 
qceqC t 0),(
θθ =    
When the “damping parameter”, t, is less than zero, a higher value for θ results in 
lower costs of production.  In the limit as θ approaches infinity, the cost of production 
approaches zero.  Therefore, the selection of an appropriate probability distribution for θ 
is important and the choice of cost function will depend on the distribution of θ.  For 
distributions that span the full range of positive values, one must ensure that there is little 
likelihood of being in a range of values that would allow for costless production of 
feedstock.  This implies using a distribution weighted away from infinity, such as the 
exponential. 
An attractive feature of this cost structure is that one may use moment generating 
functions ( [ ]teEtM θ=)( ) for the chosen distribution of θ to determine closed-form 
solutions to expectations of the objective functions.  The moment-generating function 










 Learning investment, e, plays a role in the determination of the value of θ by 
acting as a parameter of the probability distribution.  In the case of a single-parameter 
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distribution like the exponential, the learning investment can be represented by β, the 
parameter of the distribution. Through proper definition of learning effort, one can ensure 
that higher levels of investment lead to higher probability of low production costs. 
The exponential distribution also exhibits the desired properties of a distribution 
function as outlined in the theoretical model.  Defining learning investment in terms of β, 
one can show that an increase in β leads to a decrease in the probability that costs will be 
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This expression simplifies the evaluation of expectations that occur in both the grower 
and processor objective functions. The sensitivity of expected production costs to the 
learning investment, or elasticity of learning investment, varies with the value of the 
parameter, t.   This parameter, the damping parameter, represents the responsiveness of 
switchgrass production cost to the effort exerted toward learning, β.  Thus, the model 
simulation employs several values for the damping parameter to evaluate the industry 
under several plausible regimes.  To preserve the relationship of decreasing expected 
costs with increasing learning effort, the damping parameter must be negative.   
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The set of values for the damping parameter were chosen so that the expected reduction 
in costs, when learning effort β=100, roughly ranged from about 10% when t=-0.001, to 
about 50% when t=-0.009.  The damping parameter values are taken from the set {-0.001, 
-0.003, -0.005, -0.007, -0.009}.   
Cost of learning investment 
 The learning investment, β, is loosely defined in the simulation.  The simulation 
seeks to determine the relative scale of learning investment under different scenarios and 
regimes.  Learning effort has been described earlier as the additional care that is taken by 
a grower to observe and monitor crop development and to adjust actions based on input 
responses.  As such, the disutility of learning effort may be calibrated to some form of 
managerial cost.  However, the learning investment determined in the simulation should 
not be interpreted as any particular quantity of cost or effort, such as a wage rate or hours 
of labor.  It should be interpreted as an indicator of the relative amount of effort chosen 
under different scenarios and regimes.  The usefulness of this measure is found in 
comparison between first best and contracting scenarios.   
An estimate for management needs is loosely based on Larson and Marrison 
estimates for the optimal scale of the project, or about 270 MW.  A facility of this size 
requires about 1,100,000 tons per year of switchgrass, which may be produced on an 
estimated 220,000 acres of land.  Assuming an average farm size of 350 acres (as in the 
case of the Chariton Valley), then this implies a minimum of 625 farms will be employed 
in the production of energy crops.  If one assumes that one manager is needed per farm to 
exert the learning effort, then this translates to about 2000 hours or management per year 
per farm.  The establishment phase in which the effort must be exerted is approximately 
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two years.  Thus, two years of effort on the part of 625 managers annualized over the 
thirty-year lifespan of the generation facility equates to almost 180,000 hours of learning 
effort.   
Multiplying learning effort, β, by 180,000 hours would results in a linear estimate 
of the total learning investment.  In order to ensure convexity in the cost of learning 
effort, the linear relationship was approximated by a quadratic relationship through an 
appropriate choice of a learning parameter (ι ).  The learning parameter appears in the 
quadratic expression below and conveys a sense of the marginal disutility of learning 
effort.   The disutility of learning effort, d, is a function of the learning parameter and the 




2ββιβ +=d  
Values for ι  were selected so that the value of above quadratic expression would 
roughly equal 180,000β at levels of β in the range of 0 to 200.  A plot of the two 
expressions where ι =2000 is shown below.  The linear expression intersects the 
quadratic expression at approximately β =150.  Higher values of the parameter drive the 
intersection point to lower values of e.  For the simulation, values for ι  come from the set 






































Calibration of Full Model 
Comparison of the empirical model’s results under engineering assumptions with 
those results found in the literature help to determine the validity of the model’s 
calibration.  Larson & Marrison estimate the minimum cost of electricity (break-even 
price) and the optimal size of facility at the break-even price for facilities sited in North 
Central and Southeast US, as well as some regions in Brazil.  For the North Central 
Region, they report the minimum cost of electricity for HP BIG/GTCC to be 6.2 ¢/kWh 
from a 269 MW facility.  Projecting to 2020, where they estimate yields to increase by 
15%, the minimum cost of electricity is 5.4 ¢/kWh from a 290 MW facility.  These 
values adjusted to 2003 dollars, using an inflator of 1.1725, equal 7.27 and 6.32 ¢/kWh. 
The results emanate from a model that assumes full information, a single agent, 
and exogenous learning (no learning investment.)  Imposition of the same assumptions to 
the simulation allows for a replication of engineering results found in the literature.  This 
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so-called “engineering scenario” uses the basic linear production cost function with no 
probabilistic element for possible cost reductions.  As a result, there is no learning 
investment (β =0) and there is no moral hazard.  For sensitivity analysis, the scenario 
employs three values for the average cost of feedstock production: c0, 0.85c0, and 0.75c0.  
Table 2 displays the results of the simulation: break-even price (pBE), optimal plant size, 
annual feedstock utilization, and capacity utilization.  The table also displays the results 
of Larson & Marrison’s analysis for ease of comparison. 
Table 2.  Results from engineering scenario compared to results in literature 
 Calibration Results Larson & Marrison Results 
















         
c0 6.38 208 849,500 80% 7.27 269 1,163,300 85% 
0.85 c0 5.87 221 928,800 83% 6.32 290 1,254,200 85% 
0.75 c0 5.52 227 974,200 84% - - - - 
 
The results from the simulation hew closely to those found in the literature.  The 
break-even prices are approximately 15% smaller than those found in Larson, and the 
plant sizes are approximately 20% smaller.  A number of reasons exist for the 
discrepancy:  (1) choice of a quadratic production function over a fixed proportions 
technology which allows capacity utilization to vary, (2) feedstock costs reported from 
the Chariton Valley project are actually higher than the estimates used by Larson, (3) the 
use of quadratic and cubic approximations for transportation and capital costs, and (4) a 
combination of factors that might affect economies of scale between the present model 
and the engineering specification.   
Despite the differences, the results fall within the expected range of values for a 
biomass project.  The simulation appears to be reasonably well calibrated.  This exercise 
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in validation allows for greater confidence in the results derived from the simulation 
when engineering assumptions are lifted.   
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Chapter 6.  Results and Policy Implications 
The empirical model developed in the previous chapter allows for practical 
application of the theory outlined in Chapter 3.  A possible candidate for the application 
of the model is the biomass for electricity industry.  As described earlier, the industry 
widely anticipates that de facto limited liability arrangements will be necessary to ensure 
grower participation by growers in energy projects.  At current biomass production costs, 
it is questionable whether biomass will be competitive with other fuels, such as natural 
gas, for the production of electricity.  However, industry analysts contend that cost 
reductions in the production of biomass feedstock, such as switchgrass, are likely as the 
industry evolves.  The theory outlined earlier throws into doubt the ability of the industry 
to profit from these cost reductions when limited liability arrangements govern trade 
between processors and growers.   
This chapter illustrates empirically the potential effect of limited liability 
arrangements on the viability of the nascent industry.  The following analysis includes 
quantification of the potential efficiency losses via numerical simulation of a biomass 
electricity industry structured on limited-liability contracts for feedstock procurement.  
Efficiency losses are conveyed via comparison between a first best regime, i.e. single 
agent acts as grower and processor, and a contracting regime.  These losses appear as 
differences between regimes of a number of project attributes, such as break-even price 
and scale of individual biomass electricity projects, learning in switchgrass production 
and cost reductions, and profitability. 
This chapter first uses the model to establish a baseline case for a biomass 
electricity project situated in the North Central region of the United States.  After 
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establishment of the baseline, the chapter presents a sensitivity of the model’s results to 
changes in the relevant parameters: price, learning investment cost, and responsiveness of 
cost to learning investment.   The chapter then presents the effect of three possible policy 
alternatives to support the emerging industry:  a renewable energy production incentive 
(REPI) credit, a crop subsidy, and a capital subsidy.   
All solutions presented in this chapter have been obtained using Mathematica® 
5.0.  Appendix B contains a subset of the Mathematica® notebooks with algorithms used 
to derive the solutions.  Appendix C contains the verification that the solutions presented 
here meet first-order and second-order conditions necessary for a local maximum. 
Baseline Case 
Establishment of the baseline project results from an appropriate selection of three 
parameters:  responsiveness of cost to learning effort (t), relative disutility of learning 
effort (ι), and the price of electricity (p).  Several initial analyses (not shown here) tested 
the impact of the two parameters related to learning effort on the achieved level of cost 
reductions for a typical project.  The cost reductions were then compared to those that are 
expected in the literature.  The baseline values for these parameter (t=-0.003 and ι=2000) 
result in levels of cost reductions that parallel those assumed possible by Larson & 
Marrison and Graham et al.  Prior analyses in the literature have analyzed industry 
viability under a scenario where crop yields increase by approximately 25% over a ten to 
twenty year period of research and development.  This roughly converts to a 15-20% 
reduction in production costs.  Using the values for the learning-related parameters, the 
model determined break-even prices for the project under first best and contracting 
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regimes.  These break-even prices are the prices used for the baseline case of a biomass 
electricity project. 
Table 3 presents the characteristics of the baseline project under first best and 
contracting regimes.  To construct the table, the break-even price for the project under 
contracts was determined, i.e. the price of electricity at which the processor makes zero 
profit.  The optimal level of investments in learning and capital, as well as feedstock 
utilization, are determined at this break-even price in both the first best and limited 
liability contracting regimes.  Under baseline parameters, the first best project scale is a 
facility of about 330 megawatt (MW) capacity that uses 1.5 million tons of switchgrass 
per year.  The learning effort exerted in the first best results in an expected switchgrass 
production cost reduction of approximately 22%. 
In addition to the outcomes under the two regimes, Table 3 presents the distortion 
that arises under contracts as compared to the first best.  This distortion is presented as 
the ratio of investments and production under contracts to the first best.  The baseline 
project under contracts features a marked reduction in the scale of investments (K, β) and 
switchgrass usage (q).  Capital investment and feedstock use are approximately 35-40% 
less than the first best.  The learning effort under contracts is about 65% of that under the 
first best, which results in an expected switchgrass production cost reduction of about 
16%.  In addition, processor profits are $8,700,000 less under limited liability contracts 
than under first best conditions.  
Switchgrass production costs decrease by about $4/ton more under the first best 
than under contracting.  However, the effect of contracting on the viability of the project 
extends beyond the level of crop cost reductions that occur.  A critical element for 
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industry viability is the extent to which learning-induced crop reductions are passed from 
the grower onto the processor.  To examine this point, we must also look not only at the 
cost of production, but also at the prices paid by the processor for the delivered 
switchgrass.  As reported earlier, the cost of producing a ton of switchgrass before any 
learning (ex ante) is approximately $65.04, inclusive of storage costs and possible storage 
losses.  Because of learning under contracts, the cost of producing the feedstock in the 
expected state of nature9 reduces to $54.84.  The processor, in contrast, faces a price in 
the expected state of nature of $64.53.   
In this state of nature, the processor pays a price to the grower that differs from 
the ex ante price by less than 1%.  Although the grower expects a total reduction of 
$10.20 in the cost of producing a ton of switchgrass due to learning, the processor only 
expects to realize a reduction of $0.51 in the price per ton of switchgrass.  The grower 
passes only about 5% of the total cost reduction it to the processor and retains the 
remaining 95% as profit.  Essentially, the price paid by the processor for the switchgrass 
includes a 15% learning rent for the grower.   Because of the ability of the grower to 
extract information rent under a limited liability contract, a mere 6% difference in cost 
reduction between the two regimes results in a nearly 40% downward distortion in 
project size.  
The increased price paid by the processor for feedstock under limited liability also 
affects the capacity utilization of the processor investment in capital.  Capacity utilization 
is defined the amount of electricity generated by the inputs divided by the maximum 
                                                 
9 Here the expected state of nature is used in lieu of expected value to facilitate computation.  Although 
possible to calculate the expected value of feedstock and feedstock costs, the calculation is complex and 
requires significant computational power.  The difference between the expected value and the value in the 
expected state, in this context, is small.  Also, for the purpose of the comparison presented here, the 
marginal cost of computation far exceeds the marginal value of determining the expected value. 
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amount of electricity that may be produced with the available capital, or ( ) KqKf η/, .  
The individual terms used in the expression for capacity utilization are defined in Chapter 
5. Most engineering analyses implicitly assume a fixed proportions technology by 
explicitly constraining the level of capacity utilization for the analysis.  Larson and 
Marrison call this a capacity factor and fix it at 85%.  The baseline results from the 
simulation indicate that capacity utilization is in the approximate range assumed in 
engineering analyses.  The results also show that the increase in prices caused by limited 
liability contracts decreases capacity utilization by about 10% from the first best.   




















First Best $ 8,747,000 332 92.61 1,525,000 90% 14.11 $50.92 
Contracts $               - 212 62.01 863,000 80% 10.21 $64.53 
Ratio - 64% 67% 57% 89% 72% 127% 
 
The preceding comparison of the project in the first best and under limited 
liability contracts was conducted at the break-even electricity price in the contracting 
regime, 6.36 cents per kilowatt-hour.  At this price, the project under contracts derives no 
profit for the processor.  By definition, limited liability contracts guarantee the grower a 
non-negative profit.  At this break-even price, though, the project will only be marginally 
viable, perhaps operating only in periods of high demand for electricity.  In a first best 
world, the same price generates almost $9,000,000 in profits for the processor.   
Contracts also affect the viability of the project.  One may measure the effect of 
contracts on viability through changes in the break-even electricity price.  Table 4 
displays a comparison of break-even prices of the project under first best and second best 
regimes.  In addition to the prices, the table presents the investment and production 
 84
levels, as well as percentage of cost reduction related to learning effort.  The break-even 
price under first best is about 6.02 ¢/kWh, a level that is about 5% lower than that which 
occurs under contracts.  Although the first best project may still only be marginally 
viable, the price difference of nearly one-third cent per kilowatt-hour may be crucial in a 
deregulated competitive wholesale market. 
Even at its lower break-even price, the first best project exceeds the contracts 
counterpart by nearly 30% in scale and almost 50% in expected switchgrass usage.  The 
reduction in the price of the feedstock is also greater under the first best than under 
contracts by about 20%, or $2.50 per ton produced.   Under the first best, the investor in 
capital (the processor) is able to appropriate the benefits from learning under the first best 
to achieve greater viability and profitability than under contracts. 

















First best 6.02 282 80.75 1250000 87% 12.68 
Contracts 6.36 212 62.01 863000 80% 10.21 
Ratio  75% 77% 69% 92% 81% 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity to Price 
To ascertain the sensitivity of the model to the price of electricity, the baseline 
model was evaluated at three separate prices: the 6.36 ¢/kWh break-even price of before, 
as well as 6.5 ¢/kWh and 7.0 ¢/kWh.  As one would expect, an increase in price increases 
the overall profitability of the project in both the first best and contracting regimes.  In 
addition, the increased profitability increases the incentives to invest in learning, which 
increases the likelihood of cost reductions in feedstock production.   
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Increases in profitability reduce the inefficiencies caused by limited liability 
contracting.  Graph 2 depicts the changes in distortion between regimes that arise from an 
increase in price.  On the graph, three lines represent the relative distortion for each of the 
capital and learning investments, as well as expected switchgrass utilization.  Each line 
plots the ratios of first best levels to contracting levels for each of the choice variables.   
The graph clearly shows that as price increases, the ratios become larger.  This implies 
that the size of the distortion between first and second best reduces as the profitability of 
the project increases.  At the lowest price (p=6.36), the contracting levels of capital 
investment, learning effort, and feedstock usage amount to 55-65% of first best levels.  
At the highest price (p=7.0), those ratios increase to 75-95%.  







































The fourth line of the graph represents the percentage of the price paid by the 
processor that constitutes information rents above the cost of producing the feedstock.  
As price increases, the learning investment also increases, which increases the increased 
likelihood of cost reductions.  The increased possibility of reductions, in turn, results in 
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larger information rents paid to the grower.  As discussed earlier, this information rent 
leads to a distortion between first and second best capital investment and expected 
feedstock usage.  As the price increases from 6.36 to 7 ¢/kWh, the information rent 
portion of switchgrass price increases from 15% to 20%.  Despite the increasing 
proportion spent on information rent, the processor is still able to contract a lower price 
for switchgrass at higher prices of electricity.  As a result, the processor invests more, 
thereby reducing the distortion between first and second best. 
In summary, higher prices for electricity translate into greater profitability for the 
project.  As profitability increases, the processor is able to offer a contract that entices 
greater learning effort from the grower by paying more information rent, both in absolute 
magnitude and in percentage of overall price.  This learning induces greater crop 
production cost reductions, and so the processor may negotiate a lower price for 
switchgrass.  This ultimately results in a larger scale facility that uses greater quantities of 
feedstock. 
Sensitivity to the Damping Parameter 
 A crucial parameter for the analysis is the damping parameter (t), or the 
responsiveness of crop production costs to learning effort.  In this section of the 
sensitivity analysis, the value of this parameter ranges from -0.001 to -0.009.  The impact 
of changes to the parameter is examined graphically, as before, in terms of the relative 
distortion that occurs between the first best and contracting regimes.  As one would 
expect, increases in the responsiveness of crop costs to learning effort result in greater 
expected cost reductions in the project.  This leads to greater learning effort exerted on 
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the part of the grower and lower prices for switchgrass paid by the processor.  As a result, 
project scale increases, as well as profitability. 
Increasing the magnitude of the damping parameter increases capital investment, 
learning investment, feedstock utilization, and overall profitability.  Despite these, the 
distortion in capital investment and switchgrass usage increases with greater 
responsiveness of cost to learning effort.  Graph 3 below depicts the distortion between 
the two regimes arising from increasing responsiveness to learning.   
With exception to the lowest value of t, the learning effort distortion tends to 
decrease slightly as the magnitude of the parameter increases.  This is due to learning 
investment increasing at a higher rate under limited liability contracts than under the first 
best.  This is a result of the marginal diminishing returns to investment at higher levels of 
investment. Under the first best, learning investment levels reach relatively high levels 
(β>100) at t=-0.005.  Under limited liability contracts, the learning investment reaches 
moderate levels (50< β <100), and so there is a greater marginal response to increases in 
the learning investment under limited liability contracts than under the first best.  Hence, 
the rate of increase in learning investment over t is greater under limited liability 
contracts than under first best, and the distortion between the two actually decreases in 
this range. 
In the case of least responsiveness (t=-0.001), the level of distortion between first 
best and limited liability contracts is very small – the ratios between investment and 
production levels cluster around 85%.  This is because very little cost reduction in 
switchgrass production occurs, resulting in a minimal share of switchgrass price spent as 
information rent to the grower.  Movement to the right on the graph represents an 
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increase in the responsiveness of cost to learning effort or an increase in the magnitude of 
the damping parameter, which implies a greater likelihood of feedstock cost reductions 
per unit of learning effort.  As the absolute value of the parameter increases, the 
distortion between first and second best increases.   The relative size of contracting 
capital investment to first best falls to about 55%, and the relative quantity of feedstock 
usage falls to under 50%. 
This increase in distortion is a result of information rents paid by the processor to 
the grower.  In essence, the increased likelihood of cost reductions increases the value of 
private information held by the grower.  As the value of private information increases, the 
processor must offer information rents that comprise larger shares of the price of 
switchgrass.  The growing share of price devoted to information rent causes stickiness in 
the price of a ton of switchgrass, that is a decrease in the cost of producing the 
switchgrass is accompanied by disproportionately small decrease in the price of the 
switchgrass delivered to the processor.  The relative lack of price reduction deters 
investment on the part of the processor, thereby increasing the distortion between first 
best and second-best levels of capital investment and expected feedstock usage.   
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In contrast to the situation of increasing prices, the increased profitability due to 
increased cost responsiveness to learning does not result in a decrease in the distortion 
between first and second best.   In the case of increasing electricity prices, the value 
marginal product of switchgrass increases for the processor.  As a result, the processor is 
willing to pay the increase in information rent to procure the input to production.  This 
willingness to pay on the part of the processor induces greater investment on the part of 
the grower that results in greater learning, lower feedstock prices, and greater 
profitability.  In the case of increasing cost responsiveness to learning effort, the marginal 
value product of switchgrass does not increase for the processor.  However, to entice the 
growers to invest in learning, the processor must be willing to pay a greater share of 
information rent to the grower.  Paying more information rent reduces the cost of 
producing the feedstock by offering incentives to exert learning effort.  Yet, the learning 
does not result in an overall price decrease to the processor.   
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The processor, therefore, does not have the incentive needed to invest in a larger 
facility and so feedstock usage and learning effort remain well below first best levels.   
The disincentives created for processor investment by limited liability contracts suggests 
the possibility of pursuing a policy to subsidize processor investment in capital.  Analysis 
appearing later in the chapter explores the effect of such a policy on the distortions 
between first best and limited liability contracting outcomes. 
Sensitivity to the Cost of Learning Effort 
 The final parameter for the sensitivity analysis is the learning parameter (ι) that is 
linked to the cost of learning effort exerted by the grower (β).  As described earlier, the 
learning parameter has been calibrated using a measure of equivalent managerial cost 
needed to fund learning effort.  However, this parameter in itself does not represent a 
dollar value; but it is a metric that facilitates a comparison of relative effort put forth 
under first best and contracting regimes.  For this segment of the analysis, the parameter 
ranges in value from 1000 to 5000.  An increase in the parameter represents an increase 
in the costliness, or disutility, of learning effort. 
 As one would expect, an increase in the parameter decreases the incentive to 
invest effort in learning, thereby decreasing the scale and profitability of biomass 
electricity projects.   A larger parameter value implies a reduction in the elasticity of 
switchgrass production cost to learning effort, and is akin to a decrease in the absolute 
value of the damping parameter (t).  With a reduced incentive to invest in learning comes 
a smaller reduction in production costs.  The smaller reduction in cost is associated with a 
reduced value of information to the grower.  The processor, therefore, does not need to 
pay a large share of switchgrass price devoted to information rent.   Ultimately, the 
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reduction in information rent reduces the distortion between first best and second best 
outcomes. 
 An increase in the learning parameter increases the marginal disutility of effort.  
As the parameter increases the scale of all investments and production schedules 
decrease.  However, these decreases do not occur at the same rate under the first best and 
second best regimes.  The scale of the investments decrease more rapidly with increase in 
the parameter under limited liability contracts than under first best because of the amount 
of information (learning) rent paid to the grower declines.  Therefore, relative 
investments in learning and capital investment, as well as feedstock production, increases 
with increases in the parameter. 
In short, the distortion decreases with higher cost of learning effort.  This effect is 
represented in Graph 4 below.  As the parameter increases, the share of price for 
information rent decreases and the relative distortion decreases.  At baseline (ι =2000), 
the information rent comprises about 15% the price of switchgrass paid by the processor, 
and the relative sizes of capital investment and feedstock usage are approximately 55-
65%.  Increasing the parameter to 5000 drives the information rent share to below 10%, 
and increases the relative size to about 65-75% of first best.    
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 The final segment of the empirical analysis explores the policy implications of the 
results using a comparison of the relative merits of various energy and agricultural 
policies. The potential environmental and rural development benefits arising from a 
biomass for electricity sector may justify government intervention to foster the 
emergence of the industry.  A few policies are currently in place or have been proposed 
to assist the development of the industry.  The analysis seeks to discover if any one of 
these policies is more effective at mitigating the inefficiencies created through limited 
liability contracts, thereby fostering a more competitive and sustainable industry.    
Three policies are evaluated:  the renewable energy production incentive credit 
(REPI), a crop subsidy paid to the grower, and a capital investment subsidy given to the 
processor.  This section of the chapter is composed of five segments of the analysis, three 
of which examine each policy individually and the fourth compares the relative value of 
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the policies against each other.  The fifth segment contains a discussion of other policy 
implications of the model and potential policy prescriptions. 
Renewable Energy Production Incentive 
 The REPI was established in the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (42 U.S.C. 13317).  
This credit is a direct subsidy to producers of renewable energy that is proportional to the 
quantity of electricity produced by a renewable energy project.  This credit was initially 
established at 1.5 ¢/kWh and adjusted annually for inflation.  There have been calls to re-
authorize the credit, which in 2003 dollars equals 1.85 ¢/kWh.  A project is only eligible 
for the credit during the initial ten (10) years of operation.  For the purpose of this 
analysis, which focuses on a single representative year of operation, the ten-year’s worth 
of credit has been annualized over the entire thirty (30) year expected life of a biomass 
energy project.   The resultant credit is valued at approximately 0.99 ¢/kWh.   
 Two effects of the REPI are evaluated: (1) the effect on project scale and 
profitability at baseline prices, and (2) the impact on project break-even prices.  Table 5 
below addresses the first effect.  This table recreates Table 3 for the baseline case after 
incidence of the REPI credit.  In comparison to the baseline case, the REPI reduces the 
distortion between first best and contract levels of investment and production.  The 
relative size of the choice variables under limited liability contract vis-à-vis the first best 
range from 55%-65% at the baseline, but increase to the range of 80-85% when an REPI 
is offered to the processor.  This effect could have been predicted based on the price 
sensitivity analysis above.  Here, the marginal value product of switchgrass increases for 
the processor, which increases the processor’s willingness to pay information rents to the 
grower.  This willingness induces investment on the part of the grower and increases cost 
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reductions in switchgrass production.  The amount by which switchgrass production cost 
falls is slightly greater than the amount by which learning rent increases.  As a result, the 
overall price of switchgrass paid by the processor declines slightly.  




















First Best $ 40,120,000 421 111.33 2,013,000 94% 16.33 $48.70 
Contracts $ 23,432,000 351 95.31 1,599,000 91% 14.50 $64.50 
Ratio 58% 83% 86% 79% 95% 89% 132% 
 
 The REPI credit also has the effect of increasing the intensity with which biomass 
feedstock is used by the processor for electricity generation.  This is evident by the 
increase in capital-feedstock ratio, in terms of capacity utilization, over that in the 
baseline case.  The REPI successfully increases capacity utilization by 5% in the first best 
and by over 10% in the limited liability contracting regime.   
The REPI credit affects the viability of projects through a reduction in the break-
even price of the facility.  The impact of REPI on break-even price and project scale is 
reported in Table 6 below.  In this case, the marginal value product of switchgrass to the 
processor is unaffected.  In fact, the REPI’s effect is to decrease the break-even price by 
an amount exactly equal to the REPI credit.  This implies that the marginal value product 
of switchgrass is the same both with and without an REPI at their respective break-even 






















First best 5.03 282 80.75 1250000 87% 12.68 
Contracts 5.35 212 62.01 863000 80% 10.21 
Ratio  75% 77% 69% 92% 81% 
 
 The REPI has the effect of increasing the competitiveness of biomass electricity 
by reducing the break-even price of generation.  However, the REPI does not reduce the 
inefficiency of limited liability contracting relative to the first best within the industry at 
their respective break-even prices.  The REPI has no impact on the delivered price of 
feedstock paid by the processor, but it does increase the marginal value product of the 
feedstock.  The REPI serves to shift downward the price at which the marginal value 
product of switchgrass equals the marginal cost of its procurement.  Therefore only the 
break-even price changes under the REPI.  There is no change in the level learning 
investment, nor the amount of learning-induced cost reductions, and so there is no change 
in the level of capital investment or feedstock usage by the facility. 
Feedstock Production Subsidy 
 A subsidy paid directly to growers of the switchgrass could serve as an alternative 
to the REPI credit.  The government may wish to pursue a feedstock subsidy in lieu of 
other payments, such as the Conservation Reserve Program.  A policy such as this may 
be justified through the creation of environmental amenities and rural development 
benefits arising from a biomass electricity project. 
 Here, the feedstock subsidy (σF) is in terms of dollars per ton of switchgrass 
produced and is paid directly to the grower.  To facilitate comparison of a feedstock 
subsidy with the REPI, the subsidy is calculated in two ways.  First, the subsidy is 
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estimated at the amount necessary to attain an equivalent first best project scale as that 
which occurs under the baseline price plus an REPI credit. This feedstock subsidy is 
applied to the baseline project under first best and limited liability contracting regimes. 
Second, the subsidy is estimated at the amount necessary to attain the same break-even 
prices attained under the REPI program.   Here, two subsidies are calculated, one to 
achieve the first best break even price of the baseline project plus an REPI and another to 
achieve the limited liability contracting break even price of the project plus an REPI. 
 Table 7 recreates the equivalent table for the REPI credit by displaying profit, 
capital investment, learning effort, switchgrass usage, and reduction in feedstock cost for 
the first best and contract regimes when a feedstock subsidy exists.  The table also reports 
capacity utilization and the price of biomass feedstock in the expected state of nature 
under the two regimes.  It appears that the feedstock subsidy has the same qualitative 
effect as the REPI in that it reduces the relative distortion between the two regimes as 
compared to the baseline.  The subsidy to the grower reduces the pressure on prices paid 
by the processor to the grower, i.e. the processor does not need to offer as much payment 
to induce the same learning effort and truthful revelation as in the baseline.  As a result, 
the processor can afford to purchase more feedstock and invest in a larger generation 
facility. 
 The feedstock subsidy also increases capacity utilization over the baseline case.  
The increased purchasing power of the processor for feedstock encourages greater 
intensity of feedstock usage in the generation of electricity.  Thus, a generation facility of 
the same size uses greater amount of feedstock in the presence of a feedstock subsidy 
than without the subsidy.  A subsidy of this sort would have the effect of generating 
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greater participation in a particular region in projects of this sort, for a given level of 
capital.   Greater participation implies a greater potential for spillover effects that lead to 
economic development, such as labor employment and increased commerce.  Greater 
feedstock intensity also implies more land in production and more substitution of fossil 
fuels for biomass, which has an impact on the potential for environmental benefits. 




















First Best $ 39,300,000 421 113.38 2,063,000 96% 16.52 $48.51 
Contracts $ 22,066,000 350 97.34 1,628,000 91% 14.70 $63.87 
Ratio 56% 83% 86% 79% 95% 89% 131% 
  
 To evaluate the effect of the policy of viability of the project, one may examine 
the effect of the subsidy on break-even prices.  Here, the subsidy needed to reach the 
REPI-induced break-even prices is estimated.  By holding break-even price constant 
across policies, the investment and production levels may be compared under the 
different programs.  One may thus see if one program is more effective at mitigating the 
inefficiency arising from the limited liability contracts. 
 Table 8 displays the result of the viability analysis.  Essentially Table 6 from the 
REPI analysis is recreated with the respective values for an equivalent feedstock subsidy.  
From the results, one sees that the feedstock subsidy performs better than the REPI credit 
at attenuating the distortion between first and second best outcomes.  The distortions 
under REPI at break-even prices are approximately 5% larger than those that occur under 
the feedstock subsidy.  Paying the subsidy directly to the grower appears to mitigate, 
somewhat, the problem of information rent paid by the processor.  In the case of the 
REPI, the processor is willing to pay the information rent to the grower due to an increase 
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in the marginal value product of switchgrass.  In the case of the feedstock subsidy, the 
grower is willing to reduce the price of the switchgrass delivered to the processor.  In a 
sense, the government takes on a portion of the information rent by paying a subsidy to 
the grower, reducing the overall burden to the processor and reducing (slightly) the 
distortion between first and second best outcomes. 


















First best 5.03 292 85.80 1,353,000 91% 13.33 
Contracts 5.35 232 69.68 1,000,000 85% 11.25 
Ratio  79% 81% 74% 93% 84% 
 
Capital Investment Subsidy 
 Another alternative policy is a capital investment subsidy paid directly to the 
processor, or investor in the renewable energy technology.   This policy may be justified 
on the basis that the processor will be replacing fossil fuels with a renewable resource for 
the generation of electricity.  The processor’s investment may also have some ancillary 
rural development benefits through the creation of jobs and alternative agricultural 
markets for neighboring farmers.  
The capital subsidy (σK) is in terms of dollars per megawatt of capacity 
investment in electricity generation and is paid directly to the processor.  The analysis 
proceeds as before in that the subsidy is calculated in two ways.  First, the subsidy is 
estimated at the amount necessary to attain an equivalent first best project scale as that 
which occurs under the baseline price plus an REPI credit.  Second, the subsidy is 
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estimated at the amount necessary to attain the same break-even prices attained under the 
REPI program.   
Table 9 resembles Tables 5 and 7 for the previous policies.  Compared with the 
REPI, the capital subsidy appears to have a similar effect at attenuating the distortion 
between first and second best levels of capital investment and learning effort.  However, 
the capital subsidy exacerbates the distortion in feedstock utilization.  The capital subsidy 
decreases capacity utilization by the processor, reducing the relative usage of feedstock to 
capital in the generation of electricity.  This does not bode well for using the policy over 
the REPI or feedstock subsidy to achieve environmental and economic benefits.  The 
reduction in orders for switchgrass mitigates the information rent problem to a certain 
degree, which results in a reduction in the distortion between first and second best cost 
reduction that occur under the two regimes.  However, this reduction in learning rent is 
achieved via reduced orders for feedstock production. 




















First Best $ 40,330,000 421 109.67 1,962,000 92% 16.13 $48.90 
Contracts $ 24,532,000 352 93.69 1,271,000 71% 14.24 $64.40 
Ratio 61% 84% 85% 65% 77% 88% 132% 
 
 Table 10 resembles Tables 6 and 8 from before and displays the viability analysis 
under a capital subsidy.  The break-even prices under REPI are now achieved via the 
capital subsidy to determine if there is an effect on the amount of distortion between the 
first and second best.  Here the comparison reveals that the capital subsidy is ineffective 
at reducing the distortion between first and second best regimes.   
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At lower prices for electricity, the capital subsidy creates perverse incentives for 
the investor in electricity generation.  A corner solution results from the empirical model, 
in that the generator invests the minimal amount possible in capacity and contracts for a 
minimal amount of feedstock from the grower.  This, in turn, elicits the minimal amount 
of investment in learning on the part of the grower.   
The minimum values for the choice variables are constrained by the physical 
model.  In the model, the term for investment in learning appear in the denominator of 
parts of the objective function, thereby constraining learning investment from below at 
unity.  The model also restricts the value for feedstock utilization to non-negative values 
in all states of the world.  This constraint results in a constraint on the generation capital 
investment.   The structure of the production function in the model may also be skewing 
the amount of feedstock utilization downward.  At low levels of input use, the production 
function may allow for more substitution between capital and feedstock than one might 
reasonably expect from the true technology.   
The results of the analysis of the capital subsidy indicate that the subsidy creates 
an Averch-Johnson effect, whereby the processor over-invests in capacity relative to 
biomass use in order to receive the subsidy payment.  The policy rewards the processor 
for investing in the technology, but not for actually using the technology to generate 
electricity.  On this basis, one may conclude that a capital subsidy would be inappropriate 
for addressing the problems created by limited-liability contracting and helping to jump-





















First best 5.03 263 72.27 1,060,000 79% 11.58 
Contracts 5.35 52 1 10,400 4% 0.20 
Ratio  20% 1% 1% 5% 2% 
 
Comparison of Policy Alternatives 
The final segment of this section consists of a side-by-side comparison of the 
previously mentioned policies in terms of the effectiveness at reducing the distortion 
created by contracts and the total cost of the policy to the government.  Similar to above, 
the section includes two tables that present the policies on the basis of impact at baseline 
price of electricity, and on the basis of impact on viability.  The total cost to the public 
sector in terms of the size of the subsidy per project is reported in each table to assist in 
making a final judgment about the effectiveness of each policy. 
In the prior two sections, the size of a feedstock subsidy and a capital subsidy 
were determined that would achieve the same effect on first best capital investment as 
that under a REPI credit.  The capital subsidy creates perverse incentives for the 
processor that reduces the intensity of feedstock usage for the projects.  As the 
justification for public intervention relies on the potential for ancillary benefits that arise 
from the production and usage of biomass, one may safely eliminate the capital subsidy 
from consideration by public policy makers.  This now allows for a comparison of the 
relative outcomes under limited liability contracting in the presence of the remaining two 
subsidies: REPI credit and feedstock subsidy.   
Table 11 presents the contracting outcomes relative to the first best for the two 
polices.  The first three columns of the table identify the policy, the unit cost of the 
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policy, and total resultant outlay for the policy, i.e. the cost to the government per project 
when it implements the policy.  The next columns show the size of the project relative to 
the first best outcome, as well as the size of profits relative to the first best and 
switchgrass production cost reductions.   
Table 11. Comparison of Policies at Baseline Price 







Β q Reduction 
in cost 
REPI $ 0.99/kWh $ 28,440,000 58% 83% 86% 79% 89% 
σF $ 16.86/ton $ 27,446,000 56% 83% 86% 79% 89% 
 
 The results indicate that, at the baseline price of 6.36 ¢/kWh, each of the policies 
work equally as well at reducing the distortion in capital investment and learning effort 
created by limited liability contracts.  It appears that the REPI is marginally better at 
reducing the distortion in project profits than the feedstock subsidization policy (about 
2%.)  However, re-examination of Tables 5 and 7 reveal that the feedstock subsidy leads 
to slightly larger investments in learning and larger decreases in biomass production 
costs.   The processor also pays slightly less for feedstock in the expected state of nature 
with the feedstock subsidy than with the REPI.   
The absolute magnitude of the difference in profit (as reported in Tables 5 and 7) 
is approximately $1.3 million.  The magnitude of the policy cost difference equals $1 
million.  For an additional $1 million dollars, the REPI credit generates $1.3 million 
dollars in direct project benefits over the feedstock subsidy.  In addition, $1 of REPI 
credit generates approximately 82¢ of profit for the project, whereas a $1 of feedstock 
subsidy generates about 80¢.  Because of the relatively small differences in feedstock 
usage and project scale, one may assume that the ancillary benefits will be equivalent 
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under either policy.  Therefore the REPI credit may be more attractive than the feedstock 
subsidy as an instrument to mitigate some of the impact of limited liability contracts and 
encourage investment within the industry. 
A similar analysis may be conducted using the break-even price analyses from 
previous sections.  In these sections, equivalent subsidies for feedstock and capital were 
estimated that would achieve the break-even price realized with a REPI credit.  The 
subsidies and total costs of the programs appear in Table 10 below.  The relative 
distortions of contracting outcomes to the first best also appear in the table.   
At break-even prices, the profits under both policies are zero, so comparison may 
only be made on the basis of relative distortion to the first best outcome and absolute 
scale of the resultant project.  Without considering the cost of the policies, it is clear that 
the REPI credit does not perform as well as the feedstock subsidy at the break-even price 
in terms of mitigating the negative impact of limited liability contracts.  However, in 
terms of cost to the government of the policy, the REPI outperforms the feedstock 
subsidy by over $2 million. 
In weighing the cost and benefits, one must also consider the absolute scale that 
results under each policy.  Ancillary environmental and economic benefits arising from 
the project will be directly related to the scale of the project in question.  On this score, 
the feedstock subsidy surpasses the REPI credit.  The feedstock subsidy creates 
incentives for investing in 20 MW of additional capacity over the REPI, which translates 
to over one hundred thousand additional tons of switchgrass used per annum.   
One final comparison of the projects relates to the cost to government per ton of 
switchgrass produced.  The feedstock subsidy equals $18.46/ton.  The REPI costs 
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$16,130,000 and 863,000 tons of switchgrass are produced, which equals about 
$18.69/ton.  It appears that the cost per ton of switchgrass produced in these projects is 
less when the subsidy is paid directly to the grower than to the processor (in terms of the 
REPI.)  
Table 12. Comparison of Policies to Achieve the 1st-best at Break-even Prices 
 Unit Cost Total Cost K B q Cost 
Reduction
REPI $ 0.99/kWh $ 16,130,000 75% 77% 69% 81% 
σF $ 18.46/ton $ 18,470,000 79% 81% 74% 84% 
 
Unfortunately, the results of the analysis do not clearly designate one policy as 
dominant over another.  The REPI performs slightly better than the feedstock subsidy at a 
fixed price for electricity.  However, the feedstock subsidy appears to perform better at 
break-even prices, in terms of feedstock utilization and realized cost reductions.  The 
feedstock subsidy does lead to greater production of biomass under both scenarios and so 
a valuation of the additional environmental benefits of biomass production may be in 
order.  A valuation of the ancillary benefits that result from the additional tons of 
switchgrass used under a feedstock subsidy is beyond the scope of this work.  However, 
one may argue that the additional cost of the feedstock subsidy may well be worthwhile 
for its greater potential to include more growers and more land in productive agricultural 
activity. 
Concluding Remarks 
The results presented in this section clearly show that it will be difficult for 
biomass for electricity projects to be viable in the near future.  This finding holds true 
even under first best conditions and is further compounded by the fact that the industry 
may use limited liability contracts during the establishment phase. 
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 Consider the competitive price of electricity.  The results of this chapter show that 
the price of electricity must be above 6 cents/kWh in a first best world and over 6.36 
cents when limited-liability contracts are in place.  The Energy Information Agency 
(EIA) reports that wholesale prices for electricity in 1999 (the most recent compilation of 
data available) ranged widely in value. These electricity prices are reported for the 
Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) and New England (NE) Independent System 
Operators (ISO) trading areas.  This data is not available for the MidWest ISO.  In 
general, the average monthly wholesale spot price ranged from about two (2) to four (4) 
cents per kWh.  However, during the summer months, a period of peak demand, the 
average monthly spot prices reached as high as nine (9) cents/kWh.   On a particularly 
hot day in August, the instantaneous spot prices reached a maximum of $1.00/kWh over a 
period of several hours.    
On an average price basis, biomass electricity may not be able to compete with 
other modes of electricity generation.  On a marginal cost basis, there may be a niche 
market for biomass electricity.  It may be a possible for biomass to be profitable during 
summer months.  However, the analysis contained in this chapter assumed year-round 
operation.  This implies that the appropriate scale of projects should be much smaller 
than estimated in this analysis.   There are also technological issues that must be resolved 
for a biomass facility to operate solely during periods of peak load.  Ceramic materials 
used in the biomass gasification process do not tolerate alternating periods of heating and 
cooling without accelerated degradation.  Perhaps the problem may be solved by 
minimizing the shutdown to once a year, allowing the facility to operate continuously 
during a three to four month period of anticipated high demand.   
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 Consider the cost of other fuels used to generate electricity.  EIA makes available 
data from Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) surveys of electric generation 
facilities10.  Some of this data includes the cost of fuels to the electric facilities on an 
energy basis.  In this data, the cost of fuels used for electricity generation is presented as 
a cost per unit of energy contained in the fuel.  Although the reported cost does not take 
account of the efficiency of the technology to convert that energy into electricity, a quick 
comparison of fuels may still be made.  The EIA reports that in 2002 (the earliest data 
available), coal ranged in cost from about 100 to 150 cents per million BTUs.  For natural 
gas and various fuel oils, this cost ranged from 380 to 500 cents.  Using the contract price 
of biomass determined earlier of approximately $64, the biomass cost is about 400 cents 
per million BTU.  If we use the price that would arise in the first best, this cost drops to 
312 cents.  These costs indicate that biomass is well within a competitive range for 
natural gas and fuel oils.   
This suggests that there may be room for more improvement in the processing 
technology.  The decision to invest in a particular type of generation facility does not 
hinge solely on fuel price.  The cost of capital investment is also an important 
consideration.  For the cases presented here, the cost of capital investment represents 
about 2¢/kWh. Based on the reported costs for fuels and electricity prices, one can infer 
that the capital costs for biomass may be significantly higher than that for natural gas.  It 
may be wise to emphasize research and development on the processing side of this 
emerging industry, either to improve conversion efficiency or to reduce costs. 
                                                 
10 Form FERC-423 Database, “Monthly cost and quality of fuels for electric plants data.”  Available at  
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/ferc423.html [viewed May 2004]. 
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Further increase in the costs of fossil fuels may spark a greater interest in biomass 
for electricity.  Perhaps with an increase in the price of natural gas, a project may find it 
profitable to operate in the presence of one of the subsidies explored.  In this case, short-
lived limited liability contracts may be a feasible option to ensure that test projects may 
begin operating.    In the case of the REPI, the subsidy expires after ten years of 
operation.  A processor may want to explore the option of using a trial-run (ten-year) 
limited liability contract with the understanding of opening to the contract to a more 
competitive bidding process at the end of the trial period.    The competition may be 
restricted due to concerns about transportation costs.  Yet, certain growers who have 
experienced a greater share of learning may be able to offer more switchgrass at lower 
prices, thereby allowing the processor to appropriate some of the gains that occurred in 
the trial run. 
A number of policy options are available for the public sector to pursue that may 
increase the viability of the industry, particularly in light of the potential benefits the 
industry may provide for the environment and rural economic development.  The 
Renewable Energy Production Credit, which pays electricity generators a subsidy for 
each unit of output produced using renewable sources, serves to increase the overall scale 
of projects by about 30%.  Yet, the projects under limited-liability contracts are still about 
20% smaller than optimal.  In addition, the credit actually increases the price of the 
feedstock to the processor due to the enhanced ability of the grower to extract learning 
rents from the processor.  A similar effect occurs under a feedstock subsidy, which would 
pay growers a subsidy for each unit of the biomass produced.  One clear result from the 
analysis is that a capital subsidy, where the processor is given a subsidy per unit of 
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capacity investment, is not an effective policy for the mitigation of inefficiency arising 
from limited-liability contracts.  The capital subsidy encourages processors to over-invest 
in capital relative to feedstock utilization.  Lower prices for electricity magnify this 
Averch-Johnson effect.   
Both the REPI and feedstock subsidy enhance the viability of their ability to 
reduce break-even prices of electricity.  The REPI reduces the break-even price by about 
15% from the baseline.  A feedstock subsidy could achieve the same effect at a cost to the 
government about 10-15% greater than the REPI.  However, a feedstock subsidy 
encourages greater capacity utilization on the part of the processor, or feedstock to capital 
ratio.    
Policy makers may choose to pursue other types of policies other than the 
subsidies detailed in this analysis.   The theoretical model suggests that there may be 
value to encouraging vertical integration within the industry, particularly forward vertical 
integration on the part of grower cooperatives. Here, government intervention may be 
needed to assist grower cooperatives in choosing the appropriate technologies for 
generating electricity, hiring and training personnel to operate the generation facility, and 
securing purchasers for the electricity.   
Alternatively, the government may intervene to arrange the coordination of the 
investments among processors and growers.  An extreme example of this intervention 
would be direct government participation via investment in production capacity. Once a 
facility has been constructed, the government may auction contracts to growers for the 
supply of feedstock to the facility.  A few years after the project has been established, 
perhaps at the beginning of the second growing cycle for switchgrass, the government 
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may auction the facility itself to a set of growers.  If growers know in advance of these 
auctions, it may create competition among growers to reduce costs and induce incentives 
for the investment in learning. The competition generated by the auctions themselves 
may also elicit truthful revelation of production costs, thereby allowing the processor to 
benefit from the learning-induced cost reductions. 
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Chapter 7.  Conclusion 
The issues of coordination and organization of agents within new industries have 
previously been identified as potential obstacles to the formation and viability of new 
agricultural industries, particularly in the case of biomass energy production.  However, 
this dissertation represents the first theoretical investigation into the implications of these 
obstacles for investment within new agricultural industries and empirical estimation of 
the magnitude of the issues’ impacts on profitability in the biomass energy sector. 
The dissertation combines three distinct areas of economic thought to develop a 
theoretical model for the examination of the effects of limited liability contracting on 
learning by doing and capital investment within a new agricultural industry.  The first 
area of economic thought pertains to the characteristics of many new agricultural 
industries, specifically asset specificity, temporal considerations, and multiple facets of 
uncertainty.  The combinations of these features within new agricultural industries 
indicate that there may be a need for the industry to rely on long-term contracts that 
extend a certain amount of protection to both a grower’s and a processor’s investments.  
The second area of economic thought pertains to the issue of learning-by-doing.  
Novel industries are likely to exhibit learning in the early phases of development, 
whereby costs of production decrease as agents acquire more experience.  Some of this 
learning may come in the form of public research and development freely transferred to 
the public sector via new crop hybrids and advanced cropping techniques.  Some of this 
learning may also come from repetition in production, i.e. costs decline with cumulative 
production experience.  Yet, a significant portion of this learning will not be costless and 
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will require additional exertion of effort, or a learning investment, on the part of growers 
to observe, monitor, and adjust the conditions for optimal crop cultivation.   
The third area of economic thought concerns the impact of contracts on the 
investments of agents within a principal-agent framework.  Contracts that extend 
guarantees to agents in a new agricultural industry, some of which include limited-
liability contracts, have serious consequences for the incentives to invest in these 
industries.  For the most part, the literature has focused on the effect of limited-liability 
contracts on investments undertaken by the agent, or in the case of new agricultural 
industries, the grower.  However, the results of learning investments within the industry 
will have value to both the agent (grower) that undergoes learning and the principal 
(processor) that uses the intermediate good produced by the agent.  The literature on 
learning has not explored the issue where the transfer of cost reductions in the production 
of an intermediate good to a processor may be necessary for viability of the industry in 
the production of a final good.  Nor has the literature explored the potential impact of 
limited-liability contracts on investments when the principal, as well as the agent, has an 
investment decision. 
The theoretical model in the dissertation illustrates the impact of limited-liability 
contracts in a new industry where learning may be important.  Limited-liability contracts 
create an environment of moral hazard in learning investment and adverse selection in the 
production of the intermediate good.  These two features of the contracting environment 
present difficulties for the principal to benefit from the learning-induced cost reductions 
realized at the intermediate stage of production.  Thus, the principal under-invests in the 
industry and requires less of the intermediate good.  Reduced feedstock orders decrease 
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the incentives for the agent to invest in learning, and so the ultimate cost of production of 
the intermediate good is higher than optimal. Underinvestment may prevent new 
agricultural industries, specifically those that face stiff competition in the market for the 
final goods, from achieving profitability.  In some cases, the obstacles created by moral 
hazard and adverse selection may prevent investment in the industry altogether. 
The theoretical model may be applied to any industry where a new technique has 
been devised to produce a good and where the market for the good is well-developed and 
competitive.  This is true for many new bio-based industries, where novel crops are being 
used to produce goods, such as chemicals and energy, which would not be considered 
traditional agriculture.  The dissertation applies the theoretical model to one of these new 
industries, the generation of electricity using biomass.  Via simulation of the investment 
and production within the industry, the model allows for quantification of the 
inefficiencies that may arise from limited liability contracting. 
In general, the new industry realizes project scales 25-30% smaller than optimal.  
In addition, the cost reductions in the production of the biomass feedstock are not as great 
under limited liability, which are about 20% less than what has predicted by typical 
engineering analyses.  Contracts also raise the price paid by the principal for the 
feedstock due to the need to pay learning rents, which is about 25% higher under limited 
liability contracts than the optimal. The most significant finding of the analysis is the 
resulting break-even price for electricity.  The price of electricity necessary for a biomass 
electricity project to produce zero profit is about 5% higher under limited liability 
contracts than under the first best.  In the competitive market for electricity, this small 
difference may have serious implications for the industry’s ability to compete.  Perhaps, 
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if the cost of other fuel sources continues to climb rapidly, such as natural gas, then 
biomass may become more attractive.  However, investors may not want to pin their 
hopes on the ability of the industry to reap the gains of learning-by-doing. 
A number of policy options are available for the public sector to pursue that may 
increase the viability of the industry, particularly in light of the potential benefits the 
industry may provide for the environment and rural economic development.   Of these 
policies, a capital subsidy paid to processors that invest in renewable energy technology 
is clearly not worth pursuing by policy makers.  The policy merely encourages over-
investment in capital relative to feedstock utilization.  This has the effect of reducing 
electricity output and biomass production, which reduces the ancillary benefits of 
biomass electricity. The Renewable Energy Production Credit paid to the processor per 
unit of electricity generated and a feedstock subsidy paid to growers per unit of biomass 
produced, however, serve to increase the overall scale of projects by about 30%.  Yet, 
even with these policies, the projects under limited-liability contracts are still about 20% 
smaller than optimal.  In addition, these subsidies do not significantly decrease the price 
of the feedstock to the processor.  
Both the REPI and feedstock subsidy enhance the viability of their ability to 
reduce break-even prices of electricity.  The REPI reduces the break-even price by about 
15% from the baseline.  A feedstock subsidy could achieve the same effect at a cost to the 
government about 10-15% greater than the REPI.  However, a feedstock subsidy 
encourages greater capacity utilization on the part of the processor, or feedstock to capital 
ratio.   On this basis, it may be more favorable to pursue a biomass feedstock 
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subsidization program to increase the potential for rural development through the 
intensification of electricity production within projects. 
 Alternatively, the government may choose to pursue a policy that encourages the 
formation of a vertically integrated industry through grower cooperative ownership of the 
processing stage.  There may also be the possibility of pursuing other contractual 
arrangements and coordination schemes that allow for greater ability of all participants of 
a new agricultural industry to benefit from learning and the resulting cost reductions.  It’s 
not clear how these policies may be implemented, or what actions would be necessary on 
the part of policy makers to ensure their success.   
These other governance structures and policies may prove to be fruitful avenues 
of research for those interested in ensuring that new agricultural industries emerge and 
attain some level of long-term viability.  This research must continue to address the 
issues highlighted by the present analysis, mainly those of risk aversion on the part of 
growers and processors in making specific investments and the ability of mechanisms to 
elicit appropriate levels of those investments. Learning within new agricultural industries 
provides hope that these industries may be profitable in the near future and competitive 
with other means of production.  These industries offer environmental amenities that may 
benefit all of society and offer economic benefits that may increase the welfare of rural 
communities.  However, industry organization may prevent the realization of any of these 
benefits unless the industry, or perhaps the government, is able to find some other 
suitable arrangement that provides certain guarantees to investor-participants while 
allowing all participants to profit from learning. 
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Appendix A:  Necessary Conditions for Optimal Solutions to the First 
Best and Limited-Liability Contracting Problems 
 
First Best Regime 
An optimal solution to the First Best problem described in Chapter 3 implies that 
the following second order conditions hold: 

































∂ .  Total 
differentiation of the first order condition for the intermediate good, equation (1), results 
in, 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ] 0,,, 211122 =+− dKqKpfdqqCqKpf θ ,  
and so, 











This expression may be substituted into the second-order condition for capital 
investment: 



















By Young’s Theorem, ( )qKpf ,21  = ( )qKpf ,12 , and so rearrangement of the condition 
yields, 
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Combined with convexity of the cost function, ( ) 0,11 ≥θqC , the denominator above is 
nonpositive, or: 
 ( ) ( ) 0,, 1122 ≤− θqCqKpf  
Thus, to ensure optimal solution the numerator above must be nonnegative, or the cost 
function for the input production must be sufficiently convex to ensure optimality of the 
solution. 




 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
p
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A cost function that is linear in q guarantees that the condition holds. 
 



























The cross partial derivatives in the condition above equals, 
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By Young’s Theorem, the cross-partials are equal, so either of the two conditions above 
may be used to verify that second order conditions hold at the solution to ensure 
optimality. 
Limited Liability Contracting Regime 
 The processor problem under limited liability contracts may be solved in two 
stages.  The first stage involves solution to a constrained optimal control problem to 
determine the production schedule over the states of nature, ( )θq .  The constraint to the 
problem represents the moral hazard in learning investment: 
 ( )( ) ( ) 1,2 −∫ θθθθ
θ
θ
deGqC e =0 
The above constraint may be reformulated as a differential equation, with boundary 
conditions, for a state variable, ( )θκ , within the optimal control framework (Léonard and 
Van Long).  We may define the following: 
 












 The Hamiltonian for the problem, then, is 
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The above conditions imply that the co-state variable, λ, is a constant over the entire 
range of states of nature.    
 When the Hamiltonian is jointly concave in the control and the state 
variables ( )κ,q  then the above conditions are sufficient conditions to ensure optimality of 



































The derivatives of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state variable is zero, as are all 
other derivatives associated with the state variable.  Thus, the only condition of concern 
is the following: 





















In the case of a linear cost function, the condition reduces to, 
 ( ) 0,22 ≤qKpf , 
which is ensured by concavity of the production function. 
 Once the optimal production schedule is determined, ( )θλ,,, eKq , it may be 
substituted into the second stage of the problem.  The second stage involves static 
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optimization of the processor Lagrangean over the levels of investment in capital (K) and 
learning (e): 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )


























































Application of the envelope theorem allows for determination of the first-order 
conditions for investments at the optimal production schedule: 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )














































dGeKqC e       
 A sufficient condition for a local maximum of the problem is that the determinant 
of Hessian matrix of the Lagrangean be negative.  For a constrained maximization with m 
choice variables and n equality constraints, sufficiency is ensured when the last (n-m) 
principal minors of the Hessian matrix alternate in sign, where the first of those principal 
minors has the sign equal to (-1)m+1 (Léonard and Van Long).  In this case, there are 2 
choice variables and 1 equality constraint, which means that the last principal minor, n-
m=1, must be negative.  The final principal minor is the determinant of the Hessian 
matrix.   
 If we define the function, h, to represent the constraint, so that  
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( ) ( )( ) 01,,,, 2 =−= ∫
θ
θ
θθθ dGeKqCeKh e , 






























































































































































    The second derivative with respect to the learning investment is derived below: 
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The second derivative with respect to capital investment is, 






















The cross-partial derivative is, 






















∂ proceeds via total differentiation of the first-order 
condition for the control variable q: 
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Application of the envelope theorem and substitution for the partial derivatives of q with 
respect to K and e give the set of second derivatives: 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
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 In the case of a linear cost function for the production of the intermediate good, 
( )θ,11 qC =0 and ( )θ,211 qC .  Thus, the second derivatives with respect to capital and 
learning reduce to: 
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Integration by parts allows for further simplification of the second derivative for learning 
investment. 
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 This reduces to: 
( )( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )
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The model assumes that investment has no effect on the supports of the distribution, 
which implies ( ) ( )eGeG ee ′= θθ  and ( ) ( )eGeG ee ′= θθ  for any pair of investments ( )ee ′, . 
This, in turn, implies that ( ) ( ) 0== eGeG eeee θθ .  Now the expression simplifies to: 
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If we add one final assumption that the third-order effects of investment on probability 
are negligible, ( ) 0≈eGeee θ , then the second derivative of the Lagrangean with respect to 
learning investment is becomes:   
























A linear cost function simplifies the cross-partial derivative of the Lagrangean to: 























Earlier assumptions on the production function and the first-order condition for 
utilization of the intermediate good allows for signing the majority of the expression.  
However, the impact of learning investment on the probability density function, ( )ege θ , 
depends on the state of nature.  Because the impact of the learning investment on the 
cumulative distribution is negative, then this implies that ( )ege θ  is positive at low states 
of nature and negative at high states.  Without specification of functional forms, it does 
not appear possible to determine the sign of the cross-partial derivative. 
 Concavity of the production function in the inputs ensures that the second 
derivative with respect to capital is non-positive.  The final stage to determine if second-
order conditions are met under the assumptions of the model requires differentiation of 
the constraint of the Lagrangean, h.  Differentiation of h with respect to the investments 
and simplification using a linear cost function results in, 
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 Now that all of the derivatives have been signed, it is possible to determine if the 





















































 The determinant of the Hessian must be positive.  This condition ensures 
sufficiency. Determination of whether the condition is met in the solution is only possible 
once functional forms have been specified.  Appendix C contains the verification of the 
second-order conditions as they pertain to the specified empirical model.  
Appendix B.  Sample Algorithms used in the Simulation
First Best Case
Define major elements of the model.
Production Function for Generation
f@K_, q_D := a0 + a1 * K + a2 * q + a3 * K^2 + a4 * q^2 + a5 * K * q;
Transport and Capital Cost Functions
T@q_D := t0 * q + t1 q^2;
R@K_D := r0 K + r1 K^2 + r2 K^3;
Cost Function for Feedstock
H* x is random variable representing state of the world *L
Cunc@q_, x_D := Exp@x * tD * c0 q;




dist@B_D := ExponentialDistribution@A, BD;
g@x_, B_D := PDF@dist@BD, xD
ge@x_, B_D := D@g@x, bD, bD ê. 8x Æ x, b Æ B<
G@x_, B_D := CDF@dist@BD, xD;
Ge@x_, B_D := D@G@x, bD, bD ê. 8x Æ x, b Æ B<
Gee@x_, B_D := D@Ge@x, bD, bD ê. 8x Æ x, b Æ B<
Value Function: Ex Post Profit
VFB@K_, q_, x_D := p f@K, qD - Cunc@q, xD - T@qD + sf q
Optimal Production of Feedstock given Investment in Capital and State of Nature
qFBhat = Solve@D@VFB@K, q, xD, qD ä 0, qD@@1DD;
QFB@K_, x_D := Hq ê. qFBhatL ê. 8K Æ K, x Æ x<
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Expected Electricity Generation:  Using Moment-generating function
f@K, QFB@K, xDD êê Expand
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Expected Costs of Feedstock Production, Expected Production, Expected Reduction in 
Costs
ECFB@K_, B_D := Expand@Cunc@QFB@K, xD, xDD ê. 8 „2 t x Æ H1 - 2 B tL-1, „t x Æ H1 - B tL-1<
EQFB@K_, B_D := QFB@K, xD ê. 8„t x Æ H1 - B tL-1<
ECunc@q_, B_D := Cunc@q, xD ê. 8„t x Æ H1 - B tL-1<
ER@B_D := 1 ê H1 - B tL
Second-Order Condition for Capital
Solve@D@D@xpFB@K, BD, KD, KD ä 0, KD
99K Ø 4 a3 a4 p
2 - a52 p2 - 4 a4 p r1 - 4 a3 p t1+ 4 r1 t1
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12 r2 Ha4 p- t1L ==
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Parameters








H* Parameters of TRANSPORT and CAPITAL Costs *L
r0 = 1848191.14 * 0.101;
r1 = -4026.1237 * 0.101;
r2 = 7.969360393 * 0.101;
t0 = 7.1664;
t1 = 2.19426*^-07;





Solution determined through search of price that achieves profit at or near zero with 
an operation and maintenance charge = 0.008 c/kWh.
i = 2000; t = -0.003; p = 0.0601823403 - 0.008;
NMaximizeA9xpFB@K, BD, B > 1 && K >
4 a3 a4 p2 - a52 p2 - 4 a4 p r1 - 4 a3 p t1 + 4 r1 t1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
12 r2 Ha4 p - t1L =, 8K, B<E
8-0.240823, 8B Ø 80.7519, K Ø 281.873<<
ü Expected Cost Reduction
H1 - ER@80.75192524275329`DL c0
12.6836
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ü Expected Feedstock Production
EQFB@281.87311145864936`, 80.75192524275329`D
1.25036µ106
Baseline at Contracting Break-Even Price
i = 2000; t = -0.003; p = 0.063640637 - 0.008;
NMaximizeA9xpFB@K, BD, B > 1 && K >
4 a3 a4 p2 - a52 p2 - 4 a4 p r1 - 4 a3 p t1 + 4 r1 t1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
12 r2 Ha4 p - t1L =, 8K, B<E
88.74686µ106, 8B Ø 92.6117, K Ø 332.353<<
ü Expected Cost Reduction
ER@92.61169722574058`D
0.782574
H1 - 0.783L c0
14.1137
ü Expected Price Paid for Feedstock
0.783 c0
50.9263
ü Expected Feedstock Production
EQFB@332.3530455404039`, 92.61169722574058`D
1.52544µ106
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Limited-Liability Contracts Case
Define major elements of the model.
Production Function for Generation
f@K_, q_D := a0 + a1 * K + a2 * q + a3 * K^2 + a4 * q^2 + a5 * K * q;
Transport and Capital Cost Functions
T@q_D := t0 * q + t1 q^2;
R@K_D := r0 K + r1 K^2 + r2 K^3;
Cost Function for Feedstock
H* x is random variable representing state of the world *L
Cunc@q_, x_D := Exp@x * tD * c0 q;





dist@B_D := GammaDistribution@A, BD;
g@x_, B_D := PDF@dist@BD, xD
ge@x_, B_D := D@g@x, bD, bD ê. 8x Æ x, b Æ B<
G@x_, B_D := CDF@dist@BD, xD;
Ge@x_, B_D := D@G@x, bD, bD ê. 8x Æ x, b Æ B<
Gee@x_, B_D := D@Ge@x, bD, bD ê. 8x Æ x, b Æ B<
Value Function: Ex Post Profit
P@K_, B_, q_, x_D :=
Simplify@p f@K, qD + sf q - Cunc@q, xD - T@qD + C2@q, xD * H1 - G@x, BDL ê g@x, BDD
V@K_, B_, q_, l_, x_D := P@K, B, q, xD + l * C2@q, xD * Ge@x, BD ê g@x, BD
Optimal Production of Feedstock given Investment in Capital and State of Nature
qhat = Solve@D@V@K, B, q, l, xD, qD ä 0, qD@@1DD;
Q@K_, B_, l_, x_D := Hq ê. qhatL ê. 8K Æ K, B Æ B, l Æ l, x Æ x<
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Expected Production of Feedstock given Investment in Capital and Learning
Expand@Q@K, B, l, xDD ê. 8„2 t x x2 Æ B2 A HA + 1L H1 - 2 B tL-HA+2L, „ 2 t x x Æ B A H1 - 2 B tL-HA+1L,
„ t x x Æ B A H1 - B tL-HA+1L, „2 t x Æ H1 - 2 B tL-A, „t x Æ H1 - B tL-A< êê Simplify
c0 H1 - 2 B t + B2 t2 + t lL - H-1 + B tL2 Ha2 p + a5 K p + sf - t0L
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H-1 + B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
EQ@K_, B_, l_D :=
c0 H1 - 2 B t + B2 t2 + t lL - H-1 + B tL2 Ha2 p + a5 K p + sf - t0L
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H-1 + B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
Expected Profit Function
V@K, B, Q@K, B, l, xD, l, xD êê Expand
-
c02 ‰2 t x
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 Ha4 p - t1L +
a2 c0 ‰t x p
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a5 c0 ‰t x K p
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
a22 p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 Ha4 p - t1L +
a0 a4 p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
+
a1 a4 K p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
-
a2 a5 K p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a3 a4 K2 p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ




4 Ha4 p - t1L +
B c02 ‰2 t x t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
a2 B c0 ‰t x p t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
a5 B c0 ‰t x K p t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
B2 c02 ‰2 t x t2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 Ha4 p - t1L -
c02 ‰2 t x t x l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B Ha4 p - t1L +
a2 c0 ‰t x p t x l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B Ha4 p - t1L +
a5 c0 ‰t x K p t x l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B Ha4 p - t1L +
c02 ‰2 t x t2 x l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
c02 ‰2 t x t2 x2 l2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 B2 Ha4 p - t1L +
c0 ‰t x sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
a2 p sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
a5 K p sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
B c0 ‰t x t sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
c0 ‰t x t x l sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B Ha4 p - t1L -
sf2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 Ha4 p - t1L -
c0 ‰t x t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a2 p t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a5 K p t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
B c0 ‰t x t t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
c0 ‰t x t x l t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B Ha4 p - t1L +
sf t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
t02
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 Ha4 p - t1L -
a0 p t1
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
-
a1 K p t1
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
-
a3 K2 p t1
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
% ê. 8 „2 t x x2 Æ B2 A HA + 1L H1 - 2 B tL-HA+2L, „ 2 t x x Æ B A H1 - 2 B tL-HA+1L,




4 Ha4 p - t1L +
a0 a4 p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
+
a1 a4 K p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
-
a2 a5 K p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a3 a4 K2 p2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ




4 Ha4 p - t1L -
c02
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 H1 - 2 B tL Ha4 p - t1L +
B c02 t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - 2 B tL Ha4 p - t1L -
B2 c02 t2
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 H1 - 2 B tL Ha4 p - t1L +
a2 c0 p
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L +
a5 c0 K p
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L -
a2 B c0 p t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L -
a5 B c0 K p t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L -
c02 t l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - 2 B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
B c02 t2 l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - 2 B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
a2 c0 p t l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
a5 c0 K p t l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ








2 Ha4 p - t1L -
a5 K p sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
c0 sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L -
B c0 t sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L +
c0 t l sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ




4 Ha4 p - t1L +
a2 p t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a5 K p t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 Ha4 p - t1L -
c0 t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L +
B c0 t t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L -
c0 t l t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ




2 Ha4 p - t1L -
t02
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
4 Ha4 p - t1L -
a0 p t1
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
-
a1 K p t1
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
-
a3 K2 p t1
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
a4 p - t1
134Printed by Mathematica for Students
xp@K_, B_, l_D := -
a22 p2
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
4 Ha4 p - t1L +
a0 a4 p2
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
a4 p - t1
+
a1 a4 K p2
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
a4 p - t1
-
a2 a5 K p2
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a3 a4 K2 p2
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ




















2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L
+
a5 c0 K p
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L
-
a2 B c0 p t
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L -
a5 B c0 K p t
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L -
c02 t l
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H1 - 2 B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
B c02 t2 l
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H1 - 2 B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
a2 c0 p t l
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H1 - B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
a5 c0 K p t l
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ








2 Ha4 p - t1L
-
a5 K p sf
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ




2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L
-
B c0 t sf
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L +
c0 t l sf
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ




4 Ha4 p - t1L +
a2 p t0
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a5 K p t0
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ




2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L
+
B c0 t t0
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 H1 - B tL Ha4 p - t1L
-
c0 t l t0
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ












a4 p - t1
-
a1 K p t1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
a4 p - t1
-
a3 K2 p t1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
a4 p - t1
- R@KD + sK
Eexpected Costs of Feedstock Production, Expected Reduction in Costs
EC@K_, B_, l_D := Expand@Cunc@Q@K, B, l, xD, xDD ê.
8 „2 t x x2 Æ B2 A HA + 1L H1 - 2 B tL-HA+2L, „ 2 t x x Æ B A H1 - 2 B tL-HA+1L,
„ t x x Æ B A H1 - B tL-HA+1L, „2 t x Æ H1 - 2 B tL-A, „t x Æ H1 - B tL-A<
ER@B_D := 1 ê H1 - B tL
Processor Lagrangian
L1@K_, B_, l_D := xp@K, B, lD - l i HB + 1L
Solve for Co-state Variable using First-Order Condition
lhat = Solve@D@L1@K, B, lD, lD ä 0, lD@@1DD;









jjjjH1 - 2 B tL3
i
k
jjjjH1 + BL i +
c02 t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ




2 H1 - 2 B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
-
a2 c0 p t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 H1 - B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
-
a5 c0 K p t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ








2 H1 - B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
y
{
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Learning Rent and Total and Average Payment to Grower
Integrate@-C2@Q@K, B, L@K, BD, xD, xD , 8x, 0, x<D êê Simplify
1
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
16 B t2 H-1 + B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
 
H-c02 t H-1 + B tL3 H1 + 2 B tL + c0 t H-1 - 2 B t + 4 B2 t2L Ha2 p + a5 K p + sf - t0L +
‰t x Hc02 ‰t x t H-1 + B tL3 H1 - 2 t x + 2 B t H1 + 2 t xLL +
c0 t H8 B t H-1 + B tL2 + ‰t x H-1 + 2 B tL3 H-1 + 2 t xLL Ha2 p + a5 K p + sf - t0L +
2 H1 + BL ‰t x H-1 + B tL2 H-1 + 2 B tL3 H1 - 2 t xL i Ha4 p - t1LL -
2 H1 + BL H-1 + B tL2 H-1 + 2 B tL3 i Ha4 p - t1LL
Bonus@K_, B_, x_D :=
1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
16 B t2 H-1 + B tL2 Ha4 p - t1L
 
H-c02 t H-1 + B tL3 H1 + 2 B tL + c0 t H-1 - 2 B t + 4 B2 t2L Ha2 p + a5 K p + sf - t0L +
„t x Hc02 „t x t H-1 + B tL3 H1 - 2 t x + 2 B t H1 + 2 t xLL +
c0 t H8 B t H-1 + B tL2 + „t x H-1 + 2 B tL3 H-1 + 2 t xLL Ha2 p + a5 K p + sf - t0L +
2 H1 + BL „t x H-1 + B tL2 H-1 + 2 B tL3 H1 - 2 t xL i Ha4 p - t1LL -
2 H1 + BL H-1 + B tL2 H-1 + 2 B tL3 i Ha4 p - t1LL
w@K_, B_, x_D := Cunc@Q@K, B, L@K, BD, xD, xD + Bonus@K, B, xD
aw@K_, B_, x_D := w@K, B, xD ê Q@K, B, L@K, BD, xD
Expected Electricity Generation:  Using Moment-generating function
Ef@K_, B_D := Expand@f@K, Q@K, B, L@K, BD, xDDD ê.
8 „2 t x x2 Æ B2 A HA + 1L H1 - 2 B tL-HA+2L, „ 2 t x x Æ B A H1 - 2 B tL-HA+1L,
„ t x x Æ B A H1 - B tL-HA+1L, „2 t x Æ H1 - 2 B tL-A, „t x Æ H1 - B tL-A<
Objective Function
L@K_, B_D := L1@K, B, L@K, BDD
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Parameters








H* Parameters of TRANSPORT and CAPITAL Costs *L
r0 = 1848191.14 * 0.101;
r1 = -4026.1237 * 0.101;
r2 = 7.969360393 * 0.101;
t0 = 7.1664;
t1 = 2.19426*^-07;





Solution determined through search of price that achieves profit at or near zero with 
an operation and maintenance charge = 0.008 c/kWh.
i = 2000; t = -0.003; p = 0.063640637 - 0.008; NMaximize@8L@K, BD, K ≥ 0 && B ≥ 50<, 8K, B<D
80.604764, 8B Ø 62.0101, K Ø 211.581<<
ü Expected Cost Reduction
H1 - ER@62.01011523996824`DL c0
10.2016
ü Expected Feedstock Production
EQ@211.58108850997047`, 62.01011523996824`, L@211.58108850997047`, 62.01011523996824`DD
863434.
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ü Expected Price Paid for Feedstock
aw@211.58108850997047`, 62.01011523996824`, 62.01011523996824`D
64.5305
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Appendix C. Verifying Second-Order Conditions
Define Bordered Hessian
C2@Q@K, B, l, xD, xD * Ge@x, BD êê Expand
-
c02 ‰-
xÅÅÅÅÅÅB +2 t x t x
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a2 c0 ‰-
xÅÅÅÅÅÅB +t x p t x
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B2 Ha4 p - t1L +
a5 c0 ‰-
xÅÅÅÅÅÅB +t x K p t x
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B2 Ha4 p - t1L +
c02 ‰-
xÅÅÅÅÅÅB +2 t x t2 x
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B Ha4 p - t1L -
c02 ‰-
xÅÅÅÅÅÅB +2 t x t2 x2 l
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B3 Ha4 p - t1L +
c0 ‰-
xÅÅÅÅÅÅB +t x t x sf
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B2 Ha4 p - t1L -
c0 ‰-
xÅÅÅÅÅÅB +t x t x t0
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B2 Ha4 p - t1L
% ê. 9 „- xÄÄÄÄÄÄB +2 t x x Æ
1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - 2 tM
2
, „-
xÄÄÄÄÄÄB +2 t x x2 Æ
1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - 2 tM
3
, „-
xÄÄÄÄÄÄB +t x x Æ
1
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ






2 B2 H 1ÅÅÅÅÅB - 2 tL
2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
a2 c0 p t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B2 H 1ÅÅÅÅÅB - tL
2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
a5 c0 K p t
ÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅÅ
2 B2 H 1ÅÅÅÅÅB - tL




2 B H 1ÅÅÅÅÅB - 2 tL




2 B3 H 1ÅÅÅÅÅB - 2 tL




2 B2 H 1ÅÅÅÅÅB - tL




2 B2 H 1ÅÅÅÅÅB - tL
2 Ha4 p - t1L
h@K_, B_, l_D := -
c02 t
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 B2 I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - 2 tM
2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
a2 c0 p t
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 B2 I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - tM
2 Ha4 p - t1L
+
a5 c0 K p t
ÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄÄ
2 B2 I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - tM




2 B I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - 2 tM




2 B3 I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - 2 tM




2 B2 I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - tM




2 B2 I 1ÄÄÄÄÄB - tM
2 Ha4 p - t1L
- i HB + 1L
h1@K_, B_, l_D := D@h@K, B, lD, KD ê. 8K Æ K, B Æ B, l Æ l<
h2@K_, B_, l_D := D@h@K, B, lD, BD ê. 8K Æ K, B Æ B, l Æ l<
L11@K_, B_, l_D := D@D@L1@K, B, lD, KD, KD ê. 8K Æ K, B Æ B, l Æ l<
L22@K_, B_, l_D := D@D@L1@K, B, lD, BD, BD ê. 8K Æ K, B Æ B, l Æ l<
L12@K_, B_, l_D := D@D@L1@K, B, lD, KD, BD ê. 8K Æ K, B Æ B, l Æ l<
H@K_, B_D := -h1@K, B, L@K, BDD 
Hh1@K, B, L@K, BDD * L22@K, B, L@K, BDD - h2@K, B, L@K, BDD * L12@K, B, L@K, BDDL + h2@K, B,
L@K, BDD Hh1@K, B, L@K, BDD * L12@K, B, L@K, BDD - h2@K, B, L@K, BDD * L11@K, B, L@K, BDDL
139Printed by Mathematica for Students
Parameters







H* Wê Storage = $11êton and 2 % storage losses*L
c0 = 65.04;
H* Parameters of TRANSPORT and CAPITAL Costs *L
r0 = 1848191.14 * 0.101;
r1 = -4026.1237 * 0.101;




REPI = 0.0185 * 7.3601 * 0.0726;
ü Feedstock Subsidy needed to match REPI break-even price
sf = 18.46; sK = 0; i = 2000; t = -0.003; p = 0.063640637 - 0.008 - REPI;
NMaximize@8L@K, BD, K ≥ 150 && B ≥ 30<, 8K, B<D
85458.25, 8B Ø 69.6791, K Ø 231.511<<
H@231.5112478824459`, 69.67914104686508`D
2.40719 µ 109
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